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†

This Article identifies four major global climate change problems, analyzes
whether the most prominent of the greenhouse gas (GHG) control proposals is
likely to be either effective or efficient in solving each of the problems, and then
extensively analyzes both management and technological alternatives to the
proposals. Efforts to reduce emissions of GHGs, such as carbon dioxide, in a
decentralized way or even in a few countries (such as the United States or under
the Kyoto Protocol) without equivalent actions by all the other countries of the
world, particularly the most rapidly growing ones, cannot realistically achieve
the temperature change limits most emission control advocates believe are necessary to avoid dangerous climatic changes, and would be unlikely to do so even
with the cooperation of these other countries. This Article concludes that the
most effective and efficient solution would be to use a concept long proven by
nature to reduce the radiation reaching the earth by adding particles optimized
for this purpose to the stratosphere to scatter a small portion of the incoming
sunlight back into space, as well as to undertake a new effort to better understand and reduce ocean acidification. Current temperature change goals could
be quickly achieved by stratospheric scattering at a very modest cost without the
need for costly adaptation, human lifestyle changes, or the general public’s active cooperation, all required by rigorous emission controls. Although stratospheric scattering would not reduce ocean acidification, for which several remedies are explored in this Article, it appears to be the most effective and efficient
first step toward global climate change control. Stratospheric scattering is not
currently being pursued or even developed, however; such development is particularly needed to verify the lack of significant adverse environmental effects of
this remedy. Reducing GHG emissions to the extent proposed by advocates,
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even if achievable, would cost many trillions of dollars, and is best viewed as a
last resort rather than the preferred strategy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As of late 2006, many environmentalists, some developed nations,
and the State of California appear to have concluded that there is one
climate change problem, global warming, and that there is only one
solution to it: reducing emissions of greenhouse gas (GHGs), such as
1
carbon dioxide, usually in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol or
similar decarbonization approaches. This Article asks whether there
are other related problems and other solutions to climate change that
would be more effective and efficient, and, if so, what they might be.
The problem is potentially so important to the future of humans on
Earth, and the proposed solution is so expensive, that it is vital to carefully examine whether reducing GHGs really is the best strategy before any solution is implemented. Yet to date there has been surprisingly little analysis of this issue.
The standard response to most pollution problems has been to
impose regulations limiting the production and/or discharge of the
pollutants involved, in this case GHGs. This regulatory approach has
been the basis for most of the discussions of global warming as well,
and underlies the major current efforts represented by the Kyoto Protocol and other proposals for controlling GHG emissions. Economists
have suggested that a more economically efficient approach would be

1

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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to provide economic incentives to reduce discharges, and this approach has generally been accepted by proponents of GHG control,
perhaps in recognition of the very high costs involved in GHG reduction. This pollutant mitigation approach to global warming assumes
that if somehow human-induced pollution (in this case GHGs) could
be reduced or eliminated, then all of Earth’s climate change problems
would be solved. This Article examines whether this underlying assumption is incorrect and whether the current Kyoto appraoch is
likely to reduce GHG emissions to "nondangerous" levels.
Humans have embarked on an inadvertent and potentially very
risky experiment involving rapidly increasing GHG levels in the atmosphere. The question examined here is not whether the experiment is taking place or the degree of control that might be required,
but rather whether there are efficient and effective remedies for
global climate change problems and what they might be. Because of
the extreme complexity of the problem and the number of disciplines
that need to be involved in defining a practical solution, the analysis
must necessarily be equally complicated and broadly based. Unfortunately, the few previous analyses have ignored the reality that any
remedies adopted, if they are to be successful, must not only be technically sound but also economically and politically feasible. Although
the emphasis in this Article will be on economics, a serious attempt
has been made to consider all the other factors that need to be taken
into account to find a workable solution to what may be the most difficult environmental problem that modern humans have faced.
One of the major difficulties in solving climate change problems
results from the fact that no one has really leveled with the public as
to how difficult it would be to achieve the goals that the advocates of
emissions control believe are necessary. This may entice the public to
embrace particular solutions to the problem, but in the longer run
may result in major problems for implementing these solutions as it
becomes clearer what is really involved. It seems better to outline the
full difficulties involved and then attempt to find the best available solutions. That is the goal of this Article.
Others have called for an objective analysis of available technological options to solve climate change problems. Braden Allenby expressed this as follows in a recent report from the National Academy
of Engineering:
The current approach to global climate change carries within it not
just policies, but also a vision, a teleology of the world that is, in important ways, both unexpressed and exclusionary. Perhaps for this reason,
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the role of technology has been relatively ignored throughout the negotiating process and, when it has come up, has been quickly marginalized.
In fact, there are many possible technologies that might reduce carbon loading in the atmosphere, but many of the most important ones
are out of favor. For example, nuclear energy has been excluded by
general agreement, and geoengineering (e.g., aluminum balloons in the
stratosphere to reduce incoming energy to the atmosphere) has been
shunted aside, regarded as the dream of a few eccentrics. Biotechnology
to improve agricultural efficiency and biological carbon sequestration
are clearly not acceptable to many participants in the Kyoto process, and
to many environmentalists generally. The rejection of these and other
technologies tends to reinforce the impression that the Kyoto process is
an exercise in social engineering by Europe targeted at the United
States. Regardless of the truth, this impression is obviously conducive to
conflict and deadlock (as indeed has happened). . . .
A useful process that would contribute significantly to the rational,
ethical management of the future would be to categorize technological
possibilities and determine, as objectively as we can, their risks and benefits and the optimal scale for each. We could then develop a portfolio of
options for future negotiations. Technology, especially in emotionally
and ideologically charged environmental debates, almost never provides
complete answers. But an array of technological options enables choice
and thus increases the chances that we will be able to balance the disparate values, ethics, and design objectives and constraints implicit in the
climate change discourse. Technology may help us respond to the world
2
we are creating in responsible, ethical, and rational ways.

A good example of what Allenby appears to be talking about in his
second paragraph above, concerning the rejection of new technology,
3
is provided by the recent Stern Review in Great Britain, which reviewed
the economics of climate change. The Stern Review never uses the
word geoengineering, which is the term often used for many of the
global technological solutions to the problem, and reaches radically
different conclusions from this Article. The Review enumerates numerous benefits (B) from controlling GHGs and argues that the costs
4
of control (C) would be less than the costs of global warming. But if,

2

Braden R. Allenby, Global Climate Change and the Anthropogenic Earth, in NAT’L
ACAD. ENG’G, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE CARBON DIOXIDE DILEMMA: PROMISING TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICIES 3, 8-10 (2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/
10798.html (citations omitted).
3
NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1-61
(2007), HM Treasury, United Kingdom. A prepublication version of the Stern Review is
available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_
climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm.
4
Id.

1406

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1401

as argued in this Article, most of the claimed benefits (B) can be obtained for a cost many orders of magnitude less than C (say C/4000
for the sake of discussion) by using engineered climate selection, humans would be foolish to pay the much higher cost C. Listing all the
components of B and comparing them to C does not change this real5
ity. Other reviewers have raised other concerns regarding the Review.
Allenby’s call for a reexamination of geoengineering approaches
has recently been reinforced by a number of other prominent scientists who have supported the use of geoengineering approaches for
6
global climate change control.
This Article first analyzes whether the most prominent of the
GHG approaches is likely to be either effective or efficient in solving
the global warming problem as defined by the advocates of GHG controls, and then analyzes several management and technological alternatives. This Article assumes that recent predictions as to the effects
of GHG emissions on climate by proponents of GHG control are
broadly correct and will not discuss the reasons for believing that
warming is or is not currently occurring. It will further assume that
the degree of GHG control required for controlling global warming
advocated by GHG control proponents is also correct. Rather, the
purpose of this Article is to ask what the climate change problems are,
whether the Kyoto Protocol and other decarbonization approaches
are the most useful tool for solving them, and what other approaches
might be more efficient and effective.
This Article takes a broad view of the issue not only by looking at a
broad range of climate change problems and the management and
technological options for their solution, such as Allenby suggests, but
also by viewing climate change in the larger context of both short- and
5

See, e.g., Shots Across the Stern, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2006, at 80, 80 (discussing
criticisms of the Stern Review’s emphasis of the “welfare of future generations” and
“consumption of the rich relative to that of the poor”).
6
See Oliver Morton, Is This What It Takes to Save the World?, 447 NATURE 132-36
(2007); P.J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution
To Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 7 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211 (2006) (advocating placing reflective particles in the stratosphere as more cost effective than reducing GHGs); T.M.L.
Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization, 314 SCIENCE 452, (2006) (urging a combined GHG reduction with geoengineering approaches to combat both climate change and ocean acidity); William J. Broad, How To
Cool a Planet (Maybe), N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006, at F1 (discussing proposals to rearrange the earth’s environment on a large scale, including cooling the planet by injecting sulfur into the stratosphere); Charles J. Hanley, Could Smog Protect Against Global
Warming?, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/nationworld/2003433914_webwarming16.html.
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long-term effects of natural forces and human activities on climate.
This Article argues that it is particularly important to consider the
practical implications of attempting to implement a variety of management and technological options in terms of the psychological and
political changes that would be required. Climate history is considered over the last three million years, since the beginning of the current chapter in Earth’s history, rather than the last hundred years or
even the current Holocene Epoch, which is the focus of most discussions on climate policy.
A. Needed Characteristics of Approaches Used To Control Climate Change
Joseph Aldy et al. recently enumerated six criteria to “guide an assessment of proposed global climate policy regimes: (1) the environmental outcome; (2) dynamic efficiency; (3) dynamic costeffectiveness; (4) distributional equity . . . ; (5) flexibility in the pres7
ence of new information; and (6) participation and compliance.”
Except for the addition of a seventh and an eighth criteria, the criteria
proposed in this Part are very similar to those, so substantial added
justification and detail concerning the first six criteria can be found in
the article by Aldy et al., with one exception: criterion five has been
made much more specific because of the broader perspective taken in
this Article toward the range of climate change situations that may require attention. The seventh criterion may be captured by criteria two
and three because such risks have economic costs, but since these risks
are usually poorly understood and therefore very difficult to quantify,
it appears better to make this an added criterion. The eighth is an
“other” category needed for a more general comparison of the proposals.
(1) Effective environmental outcome: Will implementing the management tool or remedy result in the desired climate management in
a timely manner? Remedies that are not effective can be worse than
no remedy, since people may believe that a problem is being solved
when it is not. Where applicable, effectiveness in controlling global
warming will be measured in terms of the likelihood that the European Union/United Nations Framework for Convention on Climate

7

See Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373, 374-79 (2003).
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8

Change 2 C maximum temperature change goal will not be exceeded
(discussed below in Part III.B), since that is the goal promoted by
most GHG control advocates.
(2) Economic feasibility: Will implementing the management tool
or remedy produce positive net economic benefits? Remedies that do
not will decrease overall human economic welfare.
(3) Cost-effectivenes: In the case of global average temperature
change, what is the cost-effectiveness of the management tool or remedy in terms (more specifically) of (3a), its long-term marginal cost
expressed in dollars per ton carbon of CO2 emissions mitigated? All
other things equal, remedies that can achieve a given goal (in this case
a given level of CO2 emissions) at lower cost are preferable to those
that achieve them at a higher cost. Marginal costs measure the cost of
the last and presumably most expensive project that would be undertaken using a given remedy and facilitate comparisons with the alternatives and with estimates of the economic benefits to be achieved.
Where there is little variation between the cost of projects per unit of
emissions reduction, this distinction concerning marginal costs is of
little importance. But where there is a broad range, this is important.
Obviously there are also opportunities for controlling other GHG
emissions, but it is assumed here that CO2 emissions control is broadly
representative of those available for other GHG emissions in terms of
the broad remedies or tools available for doing so. As discussed in
Part V.F, infra, not all the remedies discussed produce exactly the
same benefits. This makes cost-effectiveness comparisons a little dangerous, but I believe still useful in comparing the remedies if these
differences are kept in mind.
(4) Improved distributional equity: What is the impact of the management tool or remedy in terms of its impact on various human income groups or nations? Remedies that improve distributional equity
would appear to be preferable to those that do not.
(5) Provide policy flexibility: If conditions change, how easily and
how rapidly can the management tool or remedy being pursued be
changed to meet the new conditions? Because natural climate
changes may occur abruptly, particularly during periods of climate
transition, major volcanic eruptions, or nuclear conflicts, and because
of the substantial uncertainties involved, a static approach that is diffi-

8

European Environment Agency, CSI 013 Specification: Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations, http://themes.eea.europa.eu/IMS/ISpecs/ISpecification20041007131717/
guide_summary_plus_public (last visited May 1, 2007).
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cult to change in a relatively short timeframe will be much less useful
than a more flexible one. There are at least three important aspects
of flexibility in the context of climate change. The first (5a) is the
ability to alter the pace of implementation of a remedy being considered as needed to meet changing conditions. The second (5b) is the
capability to deal with global cooling as well as global warming if conditions change or a major volcanic eruption results in rapid cooling.
A third aspect (5c) is the ability to deal with global temperature distribution. As discussed in Part II, global warming and to some extent
cooling represent real risks for Spaceship Earth and its living cargo.
Given the reality of long lead times for changing the atmospheric levels of GHGs and given the less than overwhelming correlation between these levels and global temperatures, it would appear that a
faster-acting, more effective, lower-cost, and quickly reversible approach is much to be preferred in any attempt to influence global
temperatures.
(6) Not place undue demands on participation and compliance: Does
the management tool or remedy require widespread active participation and compliance to be successful? How likely is that to occur?
Greater such demands reduce the likelihood of successful implementation of a management tool or remedy.
(7) Not pose other major environmental risks or provide other environmental benefits: Does the management tool or remedy create other environmental risks unrelated to climate control? If the remedy poses a
significant risk of creating other environmental risks, the world may
not be better off as a result of using it. Or are there other environmental benefits?
(8) Have other important favorable or unfavorable characteristics: Are
there other important advantages or drawbacks to the proposed management tool or remedy not already discussed?
B. What Are the Problems?
Although the problems posed by climate change are often considered to be a single problem (usually referred to as global warming)
with a single solution (reducing GHG emissions), they can more usefully be viewed as four interrelated problems (shown in Tables 1 and
1a in the Appendix) that have both human and natural origins since
the effects of and solutions to these problems are significantly different. Conclusions concerning effective and efficient control measures
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for each problem can be found in Part V.F, infra. The four problems
are:
(P1) The general trend of global temperatures is currently a
gradual increase, and this appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future (discussed further in Part II, infra). This gives rise to most
of the identifiable adverse effects usually mentioned as the results of
global warming, including sea level rise, Arctic thawing, and possibly
increased hurricane strength, among others.
(P2) Changes in atmospheric levels of GHGs have other nontemperature-related effects. In some cases these are believed to be positive, but at least one of them, ocean acidification, appears to have important adverse effects. There may be other such adverse effects that
are not yet known.
(P3) There is an increasing risk that climate changes will trigger
various “tipping points,” where some believe that there will be particularly adverse feedbacks or other abrupt climate changes from continued global warming; some of these changes may be of a catastrophic
nature. There may also be other natural events that will result in
abrupt climate changes as well. A brief discussion of the scientific aspects of these effects can be found in Part II.F, infra.
(P4) There will almost certainly be shorter-term episodes of
global cooling resulting from major volcanic eruptions and possibly
from other natural causes as well as possible nuclear conflicts. In the
twentieth century such volcanic eruptions occurred on average about
once a decade and had significant, but not overwhelming, adverse effects. In the extreme case, however, a few of these episodes have in
the past and are practically certain at some point in the future to be
catastrophic to humans and to much of life on Earth. It is also likely
that any nuclear conflict, even a regional one, would have similar effects. A brief discussion of the scientific aspects of these effects can be
found in Part II.G, infra.
It is important to emphasize that the risks posed by each of these
problems are different in magnitude, timing, and likelihood, so they
are not directly comparable with each other. But they all impose risks
and have potential adverse effects.
C. What Are the Solutions?
One of the primary purposes of this Article is to examine some of
the major available remedies, approaches, and tools for climate control using the criteria discussed in Part I.A. These approaches can be
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divided into two general types: management and technological. In a
number of ways these two approaches are parallel and either one
could be used. In an attempt to simplify this confusing situation,
however, this Article combines the two approaches primarily on the
basis of the management approaches (MAs) but with some aspects of
the technological approaches (TAs).
1. Management Approaches
There are at least four general approaches to how humans could
“manage” these problems, with several sub-scenarios based on different assumptions:
• (MA1) Nonstabilized “business-as-usual” carbonization and adaptation;
• (MA2) Regulatory decarbonization;
• (MA2a) Kyoto and possible follow-ons;
• (MA2b) Decentralized;
• (MA2c) Liability based;
• (MA3) Engineering projects to directly change temperatures or
atmospheric GHG levels;
• (MA4) International approach using all available technologies
and approaches.
a. (MA1) Nonstabilized “Business-as-Usual” Carbonization and Adaptation
This management approach assumes that fossil fuel use and GHG
releases continue at roughly the same rate as in recent decades in
countries other than the participating Annex I nations to the Kyoto
Protocol. This means that atmospheric levels of CO2 would continue
to increase at roughly two to three parts per million by volume
9
(ppmv) per year. This approach corresponds to remedy A in Parts IV
and V and Table 2. A variation on this management approach
(MA1a) is the increased use of public information and education
campaigns to encourage people, companies, and governments to voluntarily reduce energy use or to reduce GHG emissions resulting from

9

David Adam, Surge in Carbon Levels Raises Fears of Runaway Warming, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED (London), Jan. 19, 2007, available at http://environment.guardian.co.uk/
climatechange/story/0,,1994071,00.html (reporting that from 1970 to 2000, CO2 concentrations increased by about 1.5 ppm each year, from 2001 to 2005 they increased by
an average of 2.2 ppm each year, and in 2006 by 2.6 ppm).
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its use. This variation will be referred to as MA1a and will be discussed further in Part V.E.1.
b. (MA2) Regulatory Decarbonization
This management approach assumes that governments use their
regulatory powers, such as executive actions or judicial decisions, to
decrease GHG emissions compared to what they otherwise would have
been, but do not assume direct responsibility for management of
world climate. Since most of the actions would presumably be centered on reducing GHG levels, and most GHGs contain carbon, the
approach is characterized as "decarbonization." The approach could
be described as “coercive” because the governments involved would
have to find ways and means to actively encourage their citizens and
economic units to decrease GHG emissions or to penalize those that
did not.
i. (MA2a) Kyoto Protocol and Possible Follow-ons
This management approach assumes that the world attempts to
implement the Kyoto Protocol and that similar follow-ons to it are
eventually negotiated. Since this is the most prominent of the decarbonization alternatives, it will be discussed at some length in Part III
and analyzed primarily under Remedy B in Parts IV and V and Tables
1, 1a, and 2. The Protocol allows use of certain of the technological
approaches that can also be used under MA3.
ii. (MA2b) Decentralized Approaches
This management approach assumes that governmental decarbonization takes a more decentralized approach. It assumes that various local or subnational governments take action other than through
the use of liability laws to limit GHG emissions or force one or more
unwilling national government to do so using existing laws. Examples
include California’s recent enactment of laws limiting emissions of
10
11
GHGs and the case of Massachusetts v. EPA.
Alternatively, it as-

10

California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38500-385710 (West 2007).
11
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (holding that state government plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the EPA’s assertion that it does not have authority to regulate the
emissions of GHGs associated with climate change); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 74
U.S.L.W. 3713 (U.S. 2006) (No. 05-1120) (addressing the question of whether the
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sumes that one or a few nations decide to pursue an approach that is
broadly consistent with the Kyoto Protocol but independent of actions
taken by any international body and uncoordinated with the actions
of a group of nations with significant emissions. Such legislative ac12
tions have been proposed at the national level in the United States
and appear to be the objective being pursued by many U.S. environmental organizations. This approach will be considered as a subcase
of MA2a and will be analyzed in Part V.E.2.
iii. (MA2c) Liability-Based Approaches
This management approach assumes that “tobacco-style” liability
cases are successfully used to force major GHG emitters or manufacturers of GHG-emitting equipment to reduce emissions in one or
more countries. The State of California, for example, has recently
filed suit against the six largest automakers asking that they pay dam13
ages for the GHGs that their vehicles emit. This will also be considered as a subcase of MA2a and will be analyzed in Part V.E.3.
c. (MA3) Engineering Projects To Directly Change Temperatures or
Atmospheric GHG Levels
This management approach, sometimes referred to as geoengineering, assumes that one or more governments, or an international
governmental body with the economic and technological resources to
do so, select and implement engineering projects to directly change
temperature regimes or atmospheric GHG levels for the world. These
projects may or may not involve decarbonization. In the case of engineered climate selection, use of this technology does not receive any
14
credit under the Kyoto Protocol. Although international cooperation and coordination would be desirable, one nation could theoreti-

“EPA administrator ha[s] authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants
associated with climate change”).
12
See, e.g., Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642 109th Cong. (2006); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006).
13
Nick Bunkley, California Sues 6 Automakers over Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
21, 2006, at C2.
14
The Kyoto Protocol requires that Annex I nations reduce their emissions of
GHGs. Such reductions are not required under engineered climate selection so countries would not recieve "credit" for such efforts. Kyoto does have some provisons allowing credit for carbon sequestration under some circumstances. It contains no such
provisons for TA3 approaches (defined in Part I.C.2 infra) such as engineered climate
selection.
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cally carry out a program to engineer temperatures or GHG levels for
the whole world, although probably facing great condemnation from
other countries.
d. (MA4) International Approach Including Use of All Available
Technologies and Approaches
This option is a hypothetical new international approach utilizing
the best features of all the other management approaches. It would
use all available technologies and include all sources of GHG emissions, but would apply a better rationale based on relative responsibility for the problem and the “polluter pays” principle to determine the
costs to each country. One possibility would be the creation of a
15
mandatory international fund based on past and present emissions.
This is intended as something of an “ideal” approach that solves some
of the major problems with Kyoto while also providing an international framework for coordinated reductions in GHG emissions. This
approach will be analyzed in Part V.E.4.
2. Technological Approaches
At the risk of some minor oversimplification, there would appear
to be only three general technological approaches for controlling
Earth’s temperature climate:
Alter world atmospheric GHG levels by
• (TA2a) Changing GHG emissions (referred to here as “conventional approaches” or “conventional decarbonization” and discussed in Row B of Tables 1, 1a. and 2),
• (TA2b) Removing or sequestering GHGs already in or about to
enter the atmosphere (referred to in this Article as “nonconventional decarbonization” and discussed in Part IV.C.1, infra,
and in Row C of Tables 1 and 1a and Rows C through E of Table 2),
or
• (TA3) Altering Earth’s radiation balance through other means
(referred to as “engineered climate selection” or “radiative
forcing,” or “solar radiation management” and discussed in

15

One recent suggestion along these lines has been made by Jagdish Bhagwati, A
Global Warming Fund Could Succeed Where Kyoto Failed, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at 13,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7849f5b2-2cc3-11db-9845-0000779e2340.html.
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Part IV.C.2 and Row G of Tables 1 and 1a and Rows F, G, and
H of Table 2).
The first two technological approaches (TA2a and TA2b) will be
referred to as decarbonization. The last two (TA2b and TA3) will be
defined as nonconventional or geoengineering approaches. Radiative
forcing is the change in the balance between radiation coming into
the atmosphere and radiation going out. Note that TA3 impacts only
the temperature-related effects of higher atmospheric GHG levels as
defined in Part II.D, while TA2a and TA2b impact both temperature
and nontemperature-related effects. It is also important to note that
removing GHGs that are already in the atmosphere (TA2b) can satisfy
the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, but changing Earth’s radia16
tion balance (TA3) cannot. The Kyoto Protocol also does not give
full credit for the substitution of nuclear for fossil fuel power sources,
which are nevertheless included in group TA2a to simplify the analysis.
Engineered climate selection has often been referred to as geoengineering, which has been defined by David Keith as “intentional
17
large-scale manipulation of the environment.” There are a number
of grey areas that fall between decarbonization and geoengineering,
but where in doubt they will be assumed to constitute geoengineering
for the purposes of this Article.
3. Remedies To Be Extensively Evaluated
In the interests of simplifying the analysis to manageable proportions, the two approaches towards control—management and technologial—will be consolidated for the purposes of this Article into
consideration of more limited general types of remedies, which will be
extensively analyzed. Since MA1 has a technological counterpart,
which is not to apply technology, and MA3 also has a technological
counterpart (TA2b and TA3), the choices of remedies R1 and R3 are
easy. R2 and R2a, however, are more complicated. To simplify the
analysis, this delineation omits the following management suboptions: MA1a, MA2b, MA2c, and MA4. Fortunately, these appear to
be closely related in their characteristics to the options that are considered, so will be briefly analyzed in Part V.E after the analysis of the
16

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3.
David W. Keith, Geoengineerig the Climate: History and Prospect, 25 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 245, 247 (2000), available at http://www.ucalgary.ca/~keith/papers/
26.Keith.2000.GeoengineeringHistoryandProspect.e.pdf.
17
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other options. This leaves the following remedies for the main analysis:
• (R1) Nonstabilized “business-as-usual” carbonization and adaptation, based on MA1;
• (R2) Regulatory decarbonization using “conventional” technologies (TA1a) under the Kyoto Protocol (MA2a);
• (R2a) Nonconventional decarbonization or sequestration
(TA1b), which could be undertaken under either MA2 or MA3,
depending on how MA2 is implemented;
• (R3) Engineered climate selection, combining MA3 and TA3.
Remedies R2a and R3 are broken down into subremedies, primarily along technological lines, since different technologies have different characteristics.
The primary comparison of these remedies can be found in Table
2, which uses the criteria (Columns in Table 2) outlined in Part I.A as
the basis for the comparison of the remedies (Rows in Table 2) discussed in Part IV. Figure 1 presents the economic benefit and cost aspects of results shown in Table 2, except that the tools or remedies are
shown as vertical columns. This Article relies on a number of previous
18
surveys and reviews in discussing remedies.
This Article considers how each of the four specific problems
identified earlier in this Part could be most effectively and efficiently
addressed after reviewing a range of alternative solutions that have
been proposed for the climate change control problem. The Article
18

See Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability:
Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCIENCE 981 (2002) (providing a broad overview of
the conventional and some of the nonconventional options available, with emphasis
on energy production options). There are extensive review articles on both the rationale for using nonconventional approaches as remedies for climate change, see e.g.,
Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
73, 76 (1998) (arguing that “the time has now come to expand our policy horizons to
include geoengineering”), and on the approaches themselves, see Keith, supra note 17,
at 259-69 (reviewing various proposals to “geoengineer the climate”). An earlier discussion of some of these remedies can be found in a 1992 National Academy of Sciences report. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE
WARMING, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING 433-60 (1992). Judge Posner provides a legal and economic perspective on some of the alternatives. RICHARD
A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004). Recent summaries of selected
nonconventional options can be found in Tyndall Centre & Cambridge-MIT Institute
Symposium, Macro-Engineering Options for Climate Change Management and Mitigation
(Jan. 7-9, 2004), http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/events/past_events/cmi.shtml [hereinafter
Tyndall]. To the extent possible, the options are evaluated using peer-reviewed literature. Where this is not available, the proponents’ statements are used as the basis for
comparisons, but with the source noted.
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begins by briefly summarizing some of the relevant science (Part II)
and analyzing the prospects for the Kyoto approach (Part III). The
primary discussion of alternative climate change remedies is found in
Parts IV and V. The general conclusions with regard to available alternatives are in Part V.D, the application to other management tools
in Part V.E, and the application to the four specific problems in Part
V.F. The implications of the analysis for the choice of remedies are
discussed in Part V.G. Part VI discusses some of the likely major objections to the use of engineered climate selection, and Part VII presents a summary of the Article.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
Although the purpose of this Article is not to survey the scientific
literature on climate change, a brief discussion of some aspects provides useful background for the remainder of the Article. The emphasis in this Part is on the major causes and effects of global climate
change—both anthropogenic and natural.
A. “Recent” Earth Climate History
Much of the extensive discussion in recent years of global warming and what, if anything, needs to be done about it, seems to have
been largely carried out as if the only alternative to global warming is
the climate that prevailed in the late nineteenth or early twentieth
century or, at most, that which prevailed over the last twelve thousand
years or so of the current interglacial or Holocene Epoch. This appears to ignore the larger reality that Earth has been gripped in a series of extended and worsening ice ages for the last 2.7 million years,
so that the “norm” is not the gentle climate of the current Holocene
years but rather the predominantly horrific climate of the last three
million years since the present series of ice ages began (broken only
by relatively short interglacial periods). Interglacial periods have ac19
counted for less than ten percent of the past 900,000 years and represent one extreme of this longer period—-the warm extreme. And if
the current Holocene interglacial period had followed the pattern of
the last several, it would now be ending, in the view of William Ruddiman, with possibly disastrous consequences for further human de20
velopment. In addition, there is evidence of a Holocene era 150019
20

WILLIAM F. RUDDIMAN, PLOWS, PLAGUES, AND PETROLEUM 43 (2005).
Id. at 95-105.
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year periodicity in Northern Hemisphere temperatures, with the last
21
minimum occurring 400-500 years ago. During the previous interglacial period, there were several such “cold snaps” over intervals of a
few decades without significant climatological precursors or warn22
ings. So if “recent” history were the only guide, there is reason to be
concerned that the current interglacial period may be near its end
and Earth could be headed for another 100,000 years or so in the ice
box, or that a new “cold snap” could occur during the current cen23
tury. Since at least the first of these possibilities would seem to have
much greater consequences than global warming, this Article examines the climate change question from a larger perspective of preserving as human friendly a climate as possible rather than the more limited (but still important) objective of avoiding the global warming that
now appears to be occurring.
B. Explanations for Ice Ages
A number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain these periodic ice ages. The most widely accepted of these is the Milankovitch
cycles, but others have suggested variations in the levels of cosmic dust
24
entering Earth’s atmosphere, and in solar output.
A particularly
comprehensive attempt to explain variations in global temperatures
based on the Milankovitch cycles and human impacts can be found in
25
Ploughs, Plagues and Petroleum.
The important point is that basic causation has not been firmly established, or at least not universally accepted, and is the subject of
continuing debate. It is therefore important that any remedies pro-

21

Edward Teller et al., Global Warming and Ice Ages: I. Prospects for Physics-Based
Modulation of Global Change 17 (Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., Working
Paper, 1997), available at http://www.llnl.gov/global-warm/231636.pdf [hereinafter
Teller et al., Global Warming and Ice Ages].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Charles Breiterman, Considering the Earth as an Open System, 1 J. EARTH SYS.
SCI. EDUC. (2004), http://jesse.usra.edu/articles/breiterman/breiterman-paper.html
for a recent survey of this literature. A very recent study suggests that there is a correlation between solar sunspot activity and global temperatures prior to 1970, and that
the sun may be going into a quiescent period in which global temperatures could fall
o
by 0.2 C. See Stuart Clark, Saved by the Sun, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 32,
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg19125691.100&print=true.
25
See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 35-168 (arguing that while Earth's climate was
determined largely by the Milankovitch cycles prior to 8,000 years ago, man has increasingly assumed indirect control since then).
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posed take this uncertainty into account—-hence the importance of a
criterion allowing for flexible responses (see criterion 5 in Part I.A
above).
C. Long Response Times for Climate System and Influence of Carbon Dioxide
and Earth’s Radiation Balance on Climate
Response times are an important aspect of Earth’s climate system
and vary widely. The system responds very rapidly in terms of changes
in ice-cover on land but very slowly in the case of the deep ocean. Because of the slow response times of many of the earth’s climate systems, there are long lags in the response of temperatures to changes
26
in GHG emissions and concentrations. Any attempt to actively control climate change needs to take these long response components
into account.
It is likely that changes in CO2 levels in the atmosphere, for example, are important influences on global climate but have a fairly long
27
lead time in human terms. Although not the most potent GHG, CO2
is the one that many scientists are most concerned about. However,
direct attempts to change the incoming radiation from the sun or the
outgoing radiation reflected back into space appear to be a more immediate means to influence global temperatures than changing CO2
levels.
D. A Very Brief Overview of the Causes and Effects of Global Warming
The generally accepted theory of global warming is that global
temperatures depend on the concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, since these change the earth’s absorption and retention of
heat from the sun. The GHG concentrations, in turn, are determined
by the emission of these gases into the atmosphere minus their removal from the atmosphere. The effects of higher GHG concentrations can be broken down into two major categories for the purposes
of this analysis, which correspond to problems P1 and P2 delineated
in Part I.B:
• (P1) Those that are a direct result of higher global temperatures;

26

Id.
Id. at 20-21 (comparing the amount of CO2 in the atomosphere to water in a
leaky bathtub, gradually cooling the earth as more and more leaks out).
27
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• (P2) Those that are the result of nontemperature effects of
higher GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.
E. Why Accidental Global Warming May No Longer Be Good
Ruddiman’s research implies that Earth and its human cargo had
a very narrow escape from the start of a new ice age, and entirely by
luck and by human activity undertaken for other reasons, happened
to escape what would have been an early end to modern civilization in
28
the northern latitudes. Under this interpretation, human-induced
global warming may have saved the day by avoiding a truly catastro29
phic new ice age, rather than being the cause of the problem. But
do we really want to run such risks in the future? Although it appears
unlikely that a new ice age would start at current or foreseeable CO2
levels, it is important to ask: what if Ruddiman is wrong and a new ice
age is only a few decades away if there is no intentional human intervention?
F. Instability, Lack of Full Understanding of Earth’s Climate, and the
Effects of Short-Term and Unexpected Events
Substantial uncertainties exist in predicting climate changes.
There can be little doubt, based on the results of ice cores retrieved
from Greenland and Antarctica, that there have been substantial and
sometimes abrupt (as in a decade) climate variations in the past that
cannot be explained by the Milankovitch cycles. The result, scientists
now believe, is that ice ages can begin or end in as little as a few dec30
ades or even a few years.
There is also considerable debate about whether there may be adverse feedback (or triggering of “tipping points,” where a slight rise in
the earth’s temperature can cause a dramatic change in the environment that triggers a far greater increase in global temperatures) from
global warming such that further warming would either accelerate
global warming, or, working in reverse, bring about an abrupt climate
cooling (defined as problem P3 in Part I.B). Hans Joachim

28

Id. at 95-105.
Id.
30
See RICHARD B. ALLEY, THE TWO-MILE TIME MACHINE: ICE CORES, ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE, AND OUR FUTURE 4-5 (2000) (describing the variance in onset times for
past ice ages as ranging from less than a decade to more than 10,000 years).
29
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32

Schellnhuber, James Lovelock, and others have offered a number
of concerns about this, including the following:
(1) Thawing of Arctic permafrost may release methane, a potent
33
GHG, which would promote further warming.
(2) Arctic thawing may release sufficient fresh water so as to reduce or even eliminate the oceanic “conveyor belt” that brings warm
water into the North Atlantic, warming Europe and North America,
and carries away cold, salty water into the South Atlantic and beyond.
34
This could lead to a shift of the tropical rainfall belts.
(3) Disintegration of the Greenland or West Antarctic ice sheets
may result in a substantial rise in sea level, and, in the case of
35
Greenland, a reduction in the conveyor belt.
(4) Loss of sea ice in the Arctic Sea may result in increased ab36
sorption of sunlight and possibly change major weather patterns.
Similarly, a decrease in land coverage of ice and snow would also in37
crease the absorption of sunlight.
(5) As the oceans warm, the ocean area covered by nutrient-poor
water may increase and algae growth decrease. This is likely to reduce

31

See AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber ed.,
2006), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/internat/
pdf/avoid-dangercc.pdf (focusing on the large ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica
and the ocean’s thermonaline circulation as the main causes of abrupt climate
changes).
32
See JAMES LOVELOCK, THE REVENGE OF GAIA: EARTH’S CLIMATE IN CRISIS AND
THE FATE OF HUMANITY 34-35 (2006) (arguing that the systems affecting the Earth’s
climate reinforce one another).
33
See Fred Pearce, Climate Warning as Siberia Melts, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 13, 2005,
at 12; K.M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive Feedback
to Climate Warming, 443 NATURE 71, 71 (2006) (using new methods of measuring ebullition to show that melting permafrost has increased methane release in the Siberian
thaw lakes at much higher rates than previously believed); Sergey A. Zimov, Edward A.
G. Schuur, & F. Stuart Chapin III, Permafrost and the Global Carbon Budget, 312 SCIENCE
1612, 1612-13 (2006) (describing the impact of permafrost melting on atmospheric
carbon content).
34
See Laurent Augustin et al., Eight Glacial Cycles from an Atlantic Ice Cove, 429 NATURE 623, 626-27 (2004) (describing the effect Arctic thawing has on water temperature in the North and South Atlantic).
35
See Jonathan T. Overpeck et al., Paleoclimatic Evidence for Future Ice-Sheet Instability
and Rapid Sea-Level Rise, 311 SCIENCE 1747, 1747 (2006) (linking melting ice sheets to
rising sea levels).
36
See Gabrielle Walker, The Tipping Point of the Iceberg, 441 NATURE, 802, 802
(2006) (discussing the process through which sunlight melts Arctic ice, which creates
more open water absorbing more sunlight, thus making warmer summers).
37
LOVELOCK, supra note 32, at 34.

1422

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1401

the absorption of CO2 by the algae and the generation of marine stra38
tus clouds that reflect sunlight.
(6) Increasing global temperatures may destabilize tropical rain
forests and lessen the area they cover and the global cooling they pro39
vide.
(7) The dark, heat absorbing, boreal forests of Siberia and Can40
ada are likely to extend their range as global temperatures increase.
Whether any or all of these adverse feedbacks exist or not is subject to varying degrees of scientific conjecture, as is whether or when
they may result in “tipping points.” Presumably these risks should be
carefully weighed in any assessment of the risks from problem P3. But
if any of them appear imminent, humans would be better off taking
practical steps to try to avoid them rather than to hope for a miracle.
In other words, there is sufficient uncertainty concerning whether and
when these events will happen such that it is beneficial to be prepared
to move decisively to avert pending problems if they should arise (assuming that nothing is done to prevent them in the first place).
Perhaps the scariest of these risks is (1), methane releases from
melting permafrost. A recent article describes the problem in graphic
terms as follows:
The soils of the Arctic are crammed with organic matter—a frozen
reservoir of beautifully preserved roots, leaves and other raw material
that may contain as much carbon as the whole atmosphere. They are
quite unlike soils from more temperate regions, which are mostly made
up of the parts that the bacteria cannot digest. “We are unplugging the
refrigerator in the far north,” says [Phil] Camill [of Carleton College].
“Everything that is preserved there is going to start to rot.”
Although such feedback has been discussed for almost as long as the
threat of global warming has been taken seriously by scientists, the lack
of firm data on the subject is striking. “There is a lot that we don’t know
at this point,” says Walter Oechel from San Diego State University in
California. “People haven’t quite pulled the whole picture together
yet—but what we do know is that the potential amounts are huge and
41
very, very scary.”

One of the most widely publicized of these risks is (2). Some scientists have proposed that some of the past abrupt climate changes

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Gabrielle Walker, A World Melting from the Top Down, 446 NATURE 718, 718-21
(2007).
39
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were caused by a breakdown of the oceanic “conveyor belt” that brings
warm water into the North Atlantic, warming Europe and Eastern
North America, and carries away cold salty water to the South Atlantic
42
and beyond. There are recent indications that the “conveyor belt”
has weakened by about thirty percent in recent years, possibly because
of an influx of less saline water into the North Atlantic as a result of
43
global warming-induced thawing in the Arctic. The conveyor belt is
believed to have broken down in the past. Some scientists believe that
this happened during the Younger Dryas cooling about 12,600 years
44
ago. This event began suddenly, and for its 1000-year duration the
o
45
North Atlantic region was about 5 C colder.
Although this is not
deemed an ice age in itself, it may have felt like one to the generations
who lived through it and would certainly have large economic effects
on Western Europe and possibly elsewhere if it should recur today.
One recent study concluded that there is a fifty percent risk of such a
46
conveyor belt collapse absent any action to prevent global warming.
But even with the addition of a carbon tax as might occur under MA2,
the study found that there would still be a twenty-five percent risk
which MA2 would not address even if it were fully implemented. The
authors’ conclusions would seem to have a direct bearing on the questions posed in this Article:
Such high probabilities are worrisome. Of course they should be
checked by additional modelling studies. But, if these future studies find
similar results, it would seem that the risk of a THC [conveyor belt] collapse is unacceptably large and, therefore, that measures over and above
47
the policy intervention of a carbon tax be given serious consideration.

42

See, e.g., Wallace S. Broecker, Thermohaline Circulation, the Achilles Heel of Our Climate System: Will Man-Made CO2 Upset the Current Balance?, 278 SCIENCE 1582, 1582-84
(1997) (describing the “conveyor belt” system).
43
See Harry L. Bryden, Hannah R. Longworth & Stuart A. Cunningham, Slowing of
the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation at 25º N, 438 NATURE 655, 655-57 (2005)
(listing evidence that “suggests that the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation has
slowed by about 30 per cent between 1957 and 2004”).
44
Michael E. Schlesinger et al., Assessing the Risk of a Collapse of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.stabilisation2005.com/
Schlesingerm_Thermohaline.pdf.
45
Terrence M. Joyce, Presentation to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy:
Abrupt Climate Change and the Oceans, 1 (Sept. 24-25, 2002), available at http://
www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/sep24_25_02/joyce_testimony.pdf.
46
Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 1.
47
Id. at 6-7.
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Although the modeling results of this particular study may or may
not be supported by future studies, and there is doubt among some
scientists that global warming could bring about a new collapse of the
conveyor belt, some scientists warn that global warming could result in
48
other abrupt and serious regional climate changes.
Despite considerable research to build better climate models, it is
safe to say that considerable uncertainties remain. One illustration of
this is the debate over global dimming, and the extent to which increased pollution in the twentieth century may have masked the im49
pact of higher CO2 levels on global temperatures. It is even conceivable (although probably unlikely) that, if pollution should
substantially decrease (as might be the case if a successful effort were
actually made to decrease CO2 emissions), the result could be an unexpected plateau or even an increase in global temperatures as the
dimming effect diminishes at the same time that GHG emissions decrease. Given the lag between changes in emissions and changes in
atmospheric concentrations of CO2, in fact, this could conceivably
happen in the early years of an effective effort to decrease global CO2
emissions.
G. Volcanic Eruptions and Nuclear Conflicts as a Cause of Climate Cooling
(Problem P4)
One known source of shorter-term climate cooling that is widely
ignored in discussions of climate change is major volcanic eruptions
that place sulfur-containing gases into the stratosphere. As a result of
observations concerning the climatic effects of major volcanic eruptions such as El Chichon and Mount Pinatubo, which resulted in significant observed global cooling, it has been clear that sulfurcontaining gases that reach the stratosphere from major eruptions
50
cool the planet, although they are clearly dirty and involve grossly

48

See Richard A. Kerr, Confronting the Bogeyman of the Climate System, 310 SCIENCE
432, 433 (2005) (surveying possible climate threats greater than a collapse of the conveyor belt).
49
Gerald Stanhill & Shabtai Cohen, Global Dimming: A Review of the Evidence for a
Widespread and Significant Reduction in Global Radiation with Discussion of Its Probable
Causes and Possible Agricultural Consequences, 107 AGRIC. & FOREST METEOROLOGY 255
(2001) (discussing the causes and consequences of global dimming).
50
See Alan Robock, Volcanic Eruptions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 738, 738-44 (Ted Munn ed., 2002), available at http://
climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/EGECVolcanicEruptions.pdf (describing the cooling
impact of volcanic dust); Shanaka L. de Silva, Volcanic Eruptions and Their Impact on the
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“oversized” aerosols lifted to a less than “optimal” altitude if the purpose were to decrease global temperatures. Sulfur combines with water vapor in the stratosphere to form dense clouds of tiny droplets of
sulfuric acid. These decrease tropospheric temperatures because they
absorb incoming solar radiation and scatter it back into space.
The severity of the climatic effect depends on the magnitude of
the eruption, the sulfur content of the magma, and the amount of sul51
fur released into the stratosphere as an aerosol. For extremely large
eruptions, the climatic effects will persist until the sulfur compounds
gradually drop to lower altitudes where they are washed out by rain.
In the case of major eruptions such as Mount Tambora in 1815, the
52
climatic effects were observed in 1816, the “year without a summer.”
Volcanic eruptions come in many shapes and sizes. The most
devastating of them are characterized as supervolanic eruptions. The
effects of these can be disastrous in terms of the area buried by ash,
the effects on the environment, and the resulting decrease in temperatures as a result of stratospheric scattering of incoming sunlight.
One study suggested that the Toba eruption in what is now Indonesia,
occuring roughly 74,000 years ago, might have created 5,000 tons of
53
sulphuric acid aerosols in the atmosphere. The authors concluded
o
o
that this may have resulted in global temperatures falling by 3 to 5 C.
They further suggested that the eruption may have accelerated the
world into the last ice age, from which it only emerged about 10,000
years ago. Other researchers have found evidence of an abrupt fiveto six-year decrease in temperatures close to the time of the erup54
tion. Based on all this an anthropologist has proposed that the Toba
eruption may have been responsible for a human population “bottle55
neck” about that time in which only a few thousand survived. Other
56
researchers are less certain. A calculation by still other researchers

Earth’s Climate, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WORLD CLIMATE 788, 788-94 (J. Oliver ed., 2002),
available at http://www.space.edu/documents/Volcanoclimate.pdf.
51
De Silva, supra note 50.
52
Id.
53
Michael R. Rampino & Stephen Self, Volcanic Winter and Accelerated Glaciation
Following the Toba Super-Eruption, 359 NATURE 50-52 (1992).
54
G.A. Zielinski et al., Potential Atmospheric Impact of the Toba Mega-Eruption, 23
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 837, 837-40 (1996).
55
Stanley H. Ambrose, Late Pleistocene Human Population Bottlenecks, Volcanic Winter,
and Differentiation of Modern Humans, 34 J. HUM. EVOLUTION, 623, 623-51 (1998).
56
Clive Oppenheimer, Limited Global Change Due to the Largest Known Quaternary
Eruption, 21 QUATERNARY SCI. REV. 1593-1609 (2002).

1426

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1401

has been made that there is a one percent chance of a super-eruption
57
in the next 460 to 7,200 years.
A very similar situation exists with regard to potential asteroid im58
59
pacts and nuclear conflicts, which can also result in global temperature decreases. Ben Mason et al. calculated that such volcanic
eruptions are considerably more frequent than asteroid impacts of
60
similar energy yield.
Even regional nuclear conflicts would likely
generate very large amounts of soot that would reach the stratosphere
61
as a result of fires caused by nuclear explosions. Although the Toba
eruption occurred before humans kept accurate climate or popuation
records, it would appear that some such short-term volcanic events
may have a greater impact on human welfare than those resulting
from current global warming or asteroid impacts. Although some effort is being proposed to reduce global warming and some effort is already being made to predict asteroid impacts, it appears that nothing
is being done to reduce the climatic effects of large volcanic eruptions.
Unlike global warming, adaptation is very difficult in the case of
major eruptions or nuclear conflicts since their timing and the magnitude of their effects are currently unpredictable. There can be little
doubt that there will be future major volcanic eruptions that will affect
climate. There were approximately ten in the twentieth century, or an
62
average of one per decade. None of these ten was catastrophic in
terms of its effects. De Silva states that it is generally accepted that
o
o
there will be an average temperature decrease of 0.2 to 0.5 C for one

57

Ben G. Mason, David M. Pyle & Clive Oppenheimer, The Size and Frequency of the
Largest Explosive Eruptions on Earth, 66 BULL. OF VOLCANOLOGY 735, 735-48 (2004).
58
T. Luder, W. Benz & T.F. Stocker, Modeling Long-Term Climatic Effects of Impacts:
First Results, in Catastropic Events and Mass Extinctions: Impacts and Beyond, GEOLOGICAL
SOC. OF AM. 717-29 (Special Paper 356, C. Kocherl & K.G. McLeod eds., 2002); available at http://www.climate.unibe.ch/~stocker/papers/luder02gsa.pdf (noting that
temperature drops and darkness lasting many months are some of the outcomes triggered by impact of asteroids and comets on the earth).
59
See Alan Robock et al., Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts, 6 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS DISCUSSION 11,817, 11,818 (2006), available at
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acpd-6-11817.pdf (predicting famine for billions as a result of a nuclear winter that would follow the massive use of nuclear weapons).
60
Mason et al., supra note 57.
61
Robock et al., supra note 59.
62
See David Viner & Phil Jones, Volcanoes and Their Effect on Climate (Climatic Res.
Unit, Sch. of Envtl. Scis., U.E. Anglia) (2000), available at http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/
cru/info/volcano.
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to three years after a major eruption, although there is great variability between eruptions based on the factors mentioned in the preced63
ing paragraph. This compares with an increase of global temperao
tures of about 0.6 C during the twentieth century. Although no
estimate of the economic damages from such decreases is available,
there are very likely to have been substantial costs, perhaps even as
much as the costs of global warming to date, given the greater difficulty of adapting to these effects. It is also highly probable, if not certain, that one or more future volcanic eruptions will at some time be a
64
supervolcanic eruption. Many scientists believe that such a supervolcanic eruption can be expected in Yellowstone National Park as well as
65
elsewhere. Such eruptions have occurred about 600,000 to 700,000
years apart near Yellowstone, and it has been 640,000 years since the
last one. When it occurs, it is expected to have catastrophic results for
both the United States and the world. There is no known way to decrease the direct effects of such an eruption, such as pyroclastic flows
and nationwide ash falls, but it would appear possible to prevent or
reduce the indirect effects on global temperatures if immediate action
could be taken to increase global temperatures when such eruptions
occur. These indirect effects on global temperatures, sometimes described as a volcanic winter, would probably decimate agricultural
production and thus human food supplies, something that the survivors would desperately need. It should be noted that the question appears to be not whether there will be future eruptions that will affect
climate, but rather when and where they will next occur and how serious the effects will be. The risks of such adverse events are somewhat
different from those of the other three problems listed in Part I.B.
o
There is a virtual certainty of short-term impacts averaging 0.2 to
o
0.5 C once a decade or so and a risk of extremely catastrophic events
with a much longer and even more uncertain time interval. There
appear to have been few if any attempts to reduce these risks from
volcanic eruptions.

63

See de Silva, supra note 50.
A super-volcano is defined as one that has a volcanic explosivity index (VEI) of
8. See Bill McGuire, How To Measure the Size of a Volcanic Eruption, GUARDIAN (London),
Sept. 2, 2004, at 9.
65
Ilya N. Bindeman, The Secrets of Supervolcanoes, SCI. AM., May 22, 2006, at 36, 38,
40 available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=0006E0BFBB43-146C-BB4383414B7F0000.
64
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H. What Might the Future Hold?
What can we conclude from this brief overview of climate change
science? Global temperatures appear to be affected by both human
activities as well as short- and long-term natural events and forces.
This makes predictions of future temperatures risky, although it is
clear that they need to be viewed from both a much shorter and a
much longer time horizon than that of the current warming period.
Ruddiman provides an extensive discussion of some of the possibili66
ties. He agrees that warming is the principal threat in the next few
centuries, but that an ice age is a longer-term possibility. A recent
study with a longer than usual time horizon concludes that a “business-as-usual” approach to the use of fossil fuels is likely to lead to an
o
67
8.05 C (14.5ºF) rise in average global temperatures by the year 2300.
It appears likely that the global warming that occurs will be interrupted every decade or so (on average) by unpredictable one- to
three-year global cooling from major volcanic eruptions, and although
much less likely, it is even possible that there will at some point in the
future be a volcanic or nuclear winter (as a result of a supervolcanic
eruption or a nuclear conflict) or other abrupt climatic change resulting in serious global cooling. There may also be “tipping points,”
where a continued rise in global temperatures will trigger very adverse
environmental effects. It would therefore appear prudent for humans
to consider how best to counter continuing global warming while at
the same time developing the capability to counter shorter-term
global cooling or warming on a rapid response basis.
III. WHY THE KYOTO PROTOCOL WILL NOT PREVENT CLIMATE CHANGE
AND IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS
The most prominent current management tool to control global
climate change is represented by the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to
limit emissions of GHGs by the wealthier nations. The next objective
of this Article is to analyze the Protocol to see if it is likely to prevent
adverse climate change or to achieve the goals set for it. Most econo68
mists who have examined it have seen it as deeply flawed. But before
66

See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 171-74.
See G. Bala et al., Multicentury Changes to the Global Climate and Carbon Cycle: Results from a Coupled Climate and Carbon Cycle Model, 18 J. CLIMATE 4531, 4532-33 (Nov.
2005).
68
Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the
Post-Kyoto Era, 96 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 35, 35 (2006).
67
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examining the Protocol, it is important to define what the phrases
“Kyoto approach” and “prevent global warming” mean as used in this
Article.
A. What Is Meant by the Kyoto Protocol and Approach?
The “Kyoto Protocol” as used in this Article includes any control
measure explicitly sanctioned by the Kyoto Protocol and its approved
implementing instruments. The “Kyoto approach” includes both
those actions specifically called for by the Protocol as well as other
regulatory decarbonization proposals that would have the same effect
and use the same general means. Examples of other measures include the recent law enacted in California requiring drastic reductions
69
in GHGs emitted in the state, and bills that have been introduced
into the U.S. House and Senate to do roughly the same thing nation70
ally. Although Part III deals primarily with the Protocol, many of the
conclusions reached also apply to other proposals that would fall under the Kyoto approach. These other proposals are dealt with more
explicitly in Part V.E.
B. UN/EU Goals for Controlling Global Warming
The common understanding of the phrase “prevent global warming” is presumably that global temperatures would not be allowed to
rise beyond what they currently are. This is not, however, the definition used in the discussion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Its much less demanding definition is that there be “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations . . . at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo71
genic interference with the climate system.”
The UNFCCC definition of “dangerous anthropogenic interference” is a very slippery one since the effects on global temperatures
depend on when the levels are stabilized and the GHG concentrations
they are stabilized at, which in turn depends on what level is needed
to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.” In other words, this definition does not prevent global warm-

69

See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 38500 (West 2007).
70
See, e.g., H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006).
71
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
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ing in the common understanding of the phrase. Rather, it says that
atmospheric GHG levels should be stabilized at a level that is not
“dangerous.” The European Union has a target of restricting global
o
warming to 2 C above preindustrial levels, presumably because it believes that any temperature rise above that amount would be “danger72
ous.” Most of the major proposals to limit GHG emissions use this as
their goal, so it will be used in this Article as the basis for judging the
effectiveness of the global warming aspects of the management approaches analyzed. Two bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2006
specify a similar goal of average temperature rises of no more than
o
73
2 C and stabilization of CO2 levels at 450 ppm.
One obvious question is whether a reasonable solution to the
global warming problem would be to change the interpretation of the
o
goal so that warming above 2 C would be acceptable. This is a very
important question, but it is outside the scope of this Article, since the
Article assumes that the goal for global warming control is that which
is specified by the proponents of GHG control. There are several
points that need to be made concerning this assumption, however.
The first point is that P3, the risk of abrupt climate changes resulting from higher average world temperatures, presumably increases as
temperatures rise. So, although there is no certainty that all abrupt
o
changes can be avoided if temperature changes are kept below 2 C,
there is believed to be a rapidly increasing risk above that level and no
o
certainty that 2 C is entirely safe either. Possibly for this reason, the
o
2 C limit has become the “standard” by which the effectiveness of climate change control strategies are usually judged, and it is the basis
for most proposals to reduce global warming, as well as the one used
in this Article.
o
The second point is that reasonable variations on the 2 C limit
would not change the major conclusions of this Article. If the limit

72

Council of the European Union, Climate Change: Medium and Longer Term
Emission Reduction Strategies, Including Targets—Council Conclusions, Brussels,
March 11, 2005, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st07/
st07242.en05.pdf. According to George Monbiot, the aim of preventing more than
o
2 C warming has also been overtly adopted by the UN and implicitly by the British,
German, and Swedish Governments. He also describes his rationale for the target. See
George Monbiot, Giving Up on Two Degrees, May 1, 2007, available at http://
www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/05/01/1058. The article is also available as George
Monbiot, The Rich World’s Policy on Greenhouse Gas Now Seems Clear: Millions Will Die,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (London), May 1, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/story/0,,2069395,00.html.
73
See H.R. 5642 § 702; S. 3698, § 701.
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o

were 3 C or even 4 or 5 , engineered climate selection would still be
the lowest cost means for meeting the higher limit since the cost is
o
roughly 1/4000 as much as for meeting the 2 C limit using Remedy 2.
So, although it is not clear what the cost might be for higher limits, it
is clear that it is not three or four orders of magnitude less. If, on the
other hand, there is no temperature change that would result in significantly increased risk of abrupt climate changes, there is no need
for any climate change control to reduce P3.
The third point is that hopefully the risks listed above in Part II.F,
o
as well as others, were carefully weighed by those who set the 2 C limit,
although some were probably not even known at the time.
C. GHG Stabilization Under the Kyoto Protocol
1. Kyoto Goals Unlikely To Be Met by
Most Participating Annex I Countries
The first question to be asked is whether the emission goals specified in the Kyoto Protocol are likely to be met by the participating
Annex I countries (i.e., those that ratified the Protocol and are obligated by it to make emission reductions). Currently available information suggests that it is highly unlikely that the reductions specified
in the agreement will be fully achieved in most of these countries. In
November 2005, the European Environment Agency warned “that the
74
EU was likely to cut its emissions by only 2.5% by the year 2012.” In
December 2005, the Institute for Public Policy Research concluded
that ten of fifteen EU signatories would miss their Kyoto targets with75
out “urgent action.” An earlier 2003 European Environment Agency
76
report reached the same conclusion.
Reductions in possible later follow-on periods are likely to prove
even more difficult for a number of participating Annex I nations
(such as Germany and Russia) because of the fortuitous choice of
1990 as a base year when emissions were high relative to later in the
1990s.

74

Europe ‘Behind on Kyoto Pledges’, BBC NEWS, Dec. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk_news/politics/4561576.stm.
75
Id.
76
Norm Dixon, Global Warming: Can Kyoto Accord Really Help?, BALT. CHRON. &
SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://baltimorechronicle.com/021805Dixon.shtml.
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Figure 2: World Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Two Cases,
77
1990, 2010, and 2030

2. If Achieved for Participating Nations, Kyoto Goals Are Not
Projected To Stop CO2 Emission or Temperature Increases
The most recent estimates of future world CO2 releases, assuming
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in participating Annex I countries and a continuation of it in future possible follow-on agreements,
78
suggest that CO2 emissions will continue to increase (see Figure 2).
Specifically, the U.S. Department of Energy projects that in this case
world CO2 emissions will increase 44% from 2010 to 2030 and 106%
from 1990 to 2030 (as compared with a Kyoto proposed decrease of
79
5.3% from 1990 to 2012). As long as emissions continue to increase,
CO2 concentrations will not fall. Other analyses of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs also indicate that CO2 would continue to in80
crease, although perhaps at a slower rate than it otherwise would.

77

This figure is taken from U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUT2006, at fig.6 (2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo06/
highlights.html.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
John Bongaarts, Population Growth and Global Warming, 18 POPULATION & DEV.
REV. 299, 302 (1992); Ken Caldeira, Atul K. Jain & Martin I. Hoffert, Climate Sensitivity
Uncertainty and the Need for Energy Without CO2 Emission, 299 SCIENCE 2052, 2052-54
(2003) .
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The much more drastic reductions in overall fossil fuel use re81
quired for temperature stabilization are highly unlikely, particularly
during a period when use by less developed countries is rapidly increasing and is uncontrolled under the Protocol. Any “savings” from
decreased developed country use are likely to be more than lost to
Asian fossil fuel use increases (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region,
82
1990--2030

The extra annual emissions of CO2 from new coal-fired plants in
China, India, and the United States are expected to exceed the pro83
jected reductions from Kyoto by more than a factor of five by 2012.
Current projections of CO2 releases by the International Energy
Agency similarly suggest that the Kyoto targets will not be met on a
84
worldwide basis.
81

Bongaarts, supra note 80, at 312.
This figure is taken from INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006, supra note
77, at fig.65.
83
For an excellent graph representing these expectations, see Scott Wallace,
Sources and industry estimates for Extra Annual Emissions of CO2, UDI-Platt’s, U.S. Energy
Information Administration, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2004.
84
The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) Reference
Scenario projects, based on policies in place, that by 2030, CO2 emissions will have increased by 63% from today’s levels, which is almost 90% higher than 1990 levels. Even
in the WEO’s 2004 World Alternative Policy Scenario—which analyzes the impact of
additional mitigation policies up to 2030—global CO2 emissions would increase 40%
from today’s level, putting them 62% higher than in 1990. See IEA, Overview: Pros82
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One study, presented in early 2005, concluded that GHG emissions would have to fall to between 30% and 50% of 1990 levels by
2050 if there is to be a 50-50 chance of avoiding a temperature ino
85
crease of more than 2 C. That would mean a 50% to 70% decrease
from 1990 levels and an even greater decrease from 2006 levels.
Greater assurance than a 50-50 chance of meeting the goal would require even larger reductions. The two bills introduced into the U.S.
Congress in 2006 specify a goal of an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions
o
by 2050 from 1990 levels in order to prevent more than a 2 C rise in
temperature above the preindustrial average and global atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs (presumably they actually mean CO2) from
86
exceeding 450 ppm.
In other words, the average person in the
world would have to decrease his or her direct and indirect GHGemitting activities by two-thirds or even four-fifths at the same time
that the developing countries are trying to rapidly increase their energy use. If, as the developing countries now insist, they continue to
very rapidly increase their emissions, the percentage reductions required by the developed world would be still greater. Caldeira and his
coauthors conclude that even if climate sensitivity is at the lower end
of the range of uncertainty, over 75% of primary power would need to
o
87
come from non-CO2 emitting sources if the 2 C goal is be met. And
if climate sensitivity is at the higher end of the range of uncertainty,
“nearly all of our primary power will have to come from non-CO2 emit88
ting sources.”
Put in simpler terms, this would mean that nearly
every electric power plant would need to be replaced with a hydro-,
wind-, or nuclear-based facility. This strongly suggests that trying to
o
meet the 2 C goal using this approach would be somewhere between
extremely difficult and impossible. Reuel Shinnar and Francesco
Citro estimate that $170 to $200 billion per year would be required to
89
achieve a 70% reduction in U.S. CO2 emissions over 30 years. Presumably if other countries did not meet similar reductions, the United
States would have to achieve much higher percentage reductions if
pects for CO2 Capture and Storage (2005), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/
npsum/ccsSUM.pdf.
85
Jenny Hogan, Only Huge Emissions Cuts Will Curb Climate Change, NEW SCIENTIST.COM,
Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.newscientist.com/channel/earth/climate-change/dn6964.
Monbiot, supra note 72, says that an 80% cut from current levels would be needed.
86
See H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006).
87
See Caldeira et al., supra note 80, at 2053.
88
Id. at 2054.
89
Reuel Shinnar & Francesco Citro, A Road Map to U.S. Decarbonization, 313 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (2006). The total undiscounted cost would be about $6 trillion.
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o

the 2 C goal were to be met. So it is not impossible—just extremely
expensive and impractical unless the population is placed on a freedom-of-choice limiting energy rationing system, such as has recently
been discussed in Great Britain, and unless the rest of the world (including the developing nations) achieves similar reductions.
The emissions reductions required by the Kyoto Protocol would
have a negligible effect on global temperatures. A study by the National Center for Atmospheric Research concluded that the change in
global temperatures, even with United States participation, would be a
o
o
reduction of 0.11 to 0.21 C (about 6%) off global average temperatures by 2100 assuming that the Annex I nations continued to observe
90
the Kyoto limits beyond 2012. If they went back to business as usual
after 2012, the reduction would only have been about 3%. The nonparticipation by the United States in Kyoto Protocol would make these
effects even lower.
But the Kyoto goals currently only apply to industrialized participating signatories to the Protocol, whereas much of the increase in
CO2 emissions are projected to come from the less developed countries in coming years. “Mature market economies” are projected to
increase their CO2 emissions by 1.0% per year over the period 2002 to
91
2025; “emerging economies” are projected at 3.2% including China
92
at 4.0%.
The response of those advocating GHG emission control has been
93
to argue that improved technology will come to the rescue. More
90

T.M.L. Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol: CO2, CH4 and Climate Implications, 25 GEORES. LETTERS 2285 (1998), summary available at http://www.ucar.edu/
news/record/#kyoto.
91
Energy Info. Admin., Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2004, Report No. DOE/EIA-0573, at tbl.1 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/1605/gg05rpt/emission_tbls.html.
92
Id.
93
Some of the proponents of the Kyoto Protocol approach have recently made
quite sophisticated arguments concerning the effects of endogenous technical change
on the costs of control, which they believe will bring down the cost of meeting the
EU/UNFCCC goal considerably. Jonathan Köhler et al., The Transition to Endogenous
Technical Change in Climate-Economy Models: A Technical Overview to the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project, ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2006, at 17, 36-38. Although there
would undoubtedly be endogenous technical change, these arguments are questionable on a number of grounds. They assume that much of the relevant technical
change will result from “learning by doing” rather than from unrelated developments
in other sectors. Experience with the development of motor vehicle hybrids, however,
which depend on sophisticated computer technology, among other developments,
make such assumptions dubious. They also appear to assume that increased R&D on
emissions reduction technology will not have serious adverse effects on other sectors
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generally, proponents of Kyoto appear to believe that Kyoto was never
intended as the ultimate solution to global warming, but rather as a
first step down a path that would ultimately lead to achievement of the
UNFCCC goal. Currently, however, there is little evidence that countries not listed in Annex I are making any serious efforts to reduce
GHG emissions. Proponents hope that possible follow-ons to Kyoto
will involve much greater GHG emission reductions that would make
goal achievement possible. Whether there will be follow-ons and if so,
whether they would involve more effective reductions, is uncertain at
this time. The COP11 meeting in Montreal in late 2005 and the
COP12 meeting in Nairobi in late 2006 were not particularly encouraging in this respect since the underlying disagreements between the
developed and less developed countries appear to be unchanged.
3. Even If a Program To Implement the EU/UNFCCC Goals Were
Somehow Effectively Implemented Worldwide, There
Would Still Be a Substantial Risk of Temperature
Exceedences and the Need for Adaptation
Worldwide CO2 emissions are projected to increase at roughly
94
2% per year in the period 2002 to 2025, which probably implies an
95
increase in atmospheric CO2 levels of about 2 ppmv per year; atmos96
pheric CO2 levels were about 380 ppmv in 2006.
Taking into account other GHGs besides CO2 (such as methane), however, CO2e
97
equivalent levels were at least 420 in 2006. Hare and Meinshausen
from which scarce R&D resources would be diverted since these costs appear not to
have been factored in.
94
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International
Energy Outlook 2005 78 (2005), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/
forecasting/0484(2005).pdf.
95
Atmospheric levels have been increasing about 2 ppmv per year, see Dialing in
Your Own Climate, Fig. 2a, http://www.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2006/04,
in very recent years, up from an average annual increase of 1.4 ppmv from 1959 to
2004. See C.D. Keeling & T.P. Whorf, Atmospheric CO2 Records from Sites in the SIO Air
Sampling Network, in U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, TRENDS: A COMPENDIUM OF DATA ON
GLOBAL CHANGE. (Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr., 2005), available at http://
cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/co2/sio-mlo.htm.
96
Id.
97
Bill Hare and Malte Meinshausen state that there is a 40 ppm difference between CO2 and CO2e levels. Bill Hare & Malte Meinshausen, How Much Warming Are
We Committed to and How Much Can Be Avoided? 75 CLIMATIC CHANGE 111 (2006). The
Stern Review uses 430, see supra note 3, at vii. Other recent estimates of CO2e range as
high as 459. See Monbiot, supra note 72. Keeling and Whorf report atmospheric concentrations of 377 ppm CO2 in 2004, Keeling & Whorf, supra note 95. At a 2 ppm per
year increase, the 2006 level of CO2e would be about 420.
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conclude that only with CO2 levels stabilized below 400 CO2 (or 440
CO2e) is there more than a 66% chance of limiting global mean temo
98
perature increases to below 2 C. They further state that “Four out of
the 7 more recent climate sensitivity … estimates suggest that CO2eq
concentrations have to be even lower in order to have a ‘likely’ chance
of achieving a 2°C target, namely below 400ppm CO2eq in equilib99
rium.” Put another way, they conclude that “only for stabilization levels
of 400 ppm CO2 equivalent and below, the possibility that warming of
100
more than 2°C will occur could be classified as ‘unlikely.’”
Since by
2007 we are now at least 20 ppm over 400 CO2e and 20 ppm or less under 440, it appears safe to conclude that there is a significant risk that
o
the 2 C increase target will be exceeded, and that within 10 years 440 will
be exceeded except in the unlikely case that extremely drastic action is
taken to bring down future emissions over the next few years. These
higher temperatures would presumably result in considerable human
adaptation, thus decreasing the economic benefits from imposing emission controls, in addition to the risk of abrupt climate changes (P3).
4. Successful Achievement of Goals Is Too Demanding
of People and Their Governments
Attempting to control CO2 and other GHG concentrations to levels that would meet the EU/UNFCCC goals by using the Kyoto approach would require a large measure of international collaboration,
development of complex regulatory systems, willingness of governments to ignore their countries’ self-interest, and willingness of billions of people to make personal sacrifices. The benefits made possible by CO2 emissions are basic to modern civilization and provide
huge economic incentives for continued increases. Efforts to control
CO2 emissions suffer from the immense costs of shifting modern society away from its increasing dependence on fossil fuels as a source of
energy for economic growth and development. Significant progress
assumes that people would agree to, and actually implement, greatly
decreased fossil fuel consumption, which assumes that people would
be willing to give up some of the very real benefits they enjoy from the
use of fossil fuels at current or higher levels without a clear-cut, immediate “crisis” to spur them into making such sacrifices. The following quotation from Ruddiman explains some of the problems very
98

Hare & Meinshausen, supra note 97.
Id.
100
Id. at 25.
99
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well, from the point of view of someone with as intimate a knowledge
of the GHG emissions reductions that would be required as probably
anyone:
[There is] an unspoken truth about global warming that for some
reason politicians of both parties ignore. To reduce current and further
greenhouse-gas emissions to levels that would avoid most of the projected
future warming, draconian economic sacrifices would have to be enacted
that almost everyone would find intolerable: much more expensive fuel
for travel and heating, much lower/higher thermostat settings in houses
and workplaces, and extremely costly upgrades (or total replacements)
of power plants. The drag on the economy and on quality of life from
such efforts would be enormous, and few citizens would stand for it. At
this time, with current technologies, we simply cannot afford the effort
that would be required to mitigate the main impact of global warm101
ing.

This paragraph points out one of the fundamental problems in
the current approach to climate change problems adopted by most of
the developed world. Almost no one except Ruddiman has tried to
explain the magnitude of the problems that would result if GHG
emissions were to be reduced sufficiently to avoid both warming and
adverse climate feedbacks, or “tipping points.” An effective GHG
emission control approach is not a matter of maintaining the current
lifestyle in the developed world with a few adjustments and the use of
more energy-saving technology. Rather, as discussed above in Part
III.C.2, it would require wholesale changes in lifestyles in the developed world and radical changes in the development efforts of the less
developed world, as well as the introduction of most available technology, probably regardless of how expensive it may prove to be. It is
hard to overemphasize the importance of this reality. As Ruddiman
102
says, this is “an unspoken truth.”
A more analytical approach might separate the GHG reduction
problem into two components:
(1) Those measures that involve achieving roughly the same level
of individual welfare and personal freedom of choice, at a lower cost
in GHG emissions. The disadvantage of such reductions is that they
will usually increase the costs involved, which usually have an indirect
effect on living standards as well as on international competitiveness if

101
102

See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 183.
Id.
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not undertaken by everyone in the world. Examples include substitut103
ing nuclear power for fossil fuel based electric power.
(2) Those measures whose primary effect is to lower individual
welfare and freedom of choice, by directly discouraging people from
using energy for purposes that they have previously used it for and
would like to continue doing so, are likely to result in considerable
public dissatisfaction. Examples include discouraging people from
making out-of-town trips (or requiring the use of particular modes to
do so), reducing the use of automobiles in favor of other forms of
transportation, or instituting an “annual carbon allowance” as Great
104
Britain is said to be considering.
The reason for making this distinction is the difference in the political impact of these measures. In sufficiently wealthy countries
where the change in energy costs may not have a large impact on the
public, it may be possible for politicians to persuade their constituents
to accept some measures involving (1) but it may be almost impossible
to do so for those primarily involving (2). But in many less developed
countries where prices of electricity, heating oil, and other forms of
energy are already being subsidized due to strong popular demand,
even increases in prices due to (1) are likely to be politically unpalatable. Even in wealthier countries, politicians are likely to be very cognizant of increases in energy prices that are likely to make the country
less competitive internationally. They will probably favor price increases where they will not have a major impact on the price of exports and where there is no international source that could provide a
103

Although regulated industries often try to exaggerate the difficulties involved
in meeting proposed regulations, it may be significant that the Electric Power Research
Institute has carried out a new study that claims that it would take twenty years for the
U.S. electricity utility industry, which emits about one-third of U.S. global warming
gases, to reduce emissions to 1990 levels (Kyoto requires reductions below 1990 levels)
regardless of how much the industry spends. Matthew L. Wald, Study Questions Prospects
for Much Lower Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at C2.
104
One of the most prominent “prescriptions” as to how emissions can be drastically cut includes an example of component (2) since it proposes that annual average
miles driven per vehicle be reduced from 10,000 miles to 5,000 miles based on “urban
design, mass transit, and telecommuting.” Stephen W. Pacala & Robert H. Socolow,
Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 970 (2004). To the extent that this is done through coercion
rather than voluntary change (which is almost certain given people’s widely observed
reluctance to give up using their cars), this would be an example of component (2).
An even more drastic proposal for actual individual emission rationing is reported under consideration in Great Britain. See David Adam, Swipe-Card Plan To Ration Consumers’ Carbon Use, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 19, 2006, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,,1823853,00.html.
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substitute good or service at a lower cost. Electricity generation is
probably a good example. Such increases have only an indirect effect
on competitiveness.
Proponents of GHG control argue that the cost will be just a few
percent of the GNP and that future growth will be many times the
costs involved. Those who will have to pay those costs, particularly if it
is not a very broad cross-section of the population, are likely to object
strongly, however. To persuade them otherwise would require an advertising or information campaign of unprecedented scope and cost.
These costs are not usually factored into the costs of emission control,
and the public is more likely to see them as a tax that someone has
proposed to impose on them, rather than a contribution of a small
percentage of their future economic gains. Many in the developed
world will also see global warming control as a type of often unpopular foreign aid since many of the costs of global warming may fall on
less developed countries with high dependence on agriculture.
There are strong economic incentives not to reduce GHG emissions. The increasing use of fossil fuel energy to replace animal and
human power has been one of the hallmarks of modern civilization.
It has occurred because there are strong economic incentives to do so.
These incentives could be changed by government actions, but they
are so fundamental that these changes might prove to be very difficult
to bring about. As illustrated by the current problems faced by many
EU countries and Canada in meeting their Kyoto commitments, politicians would be required to maintain unusually strong resolve and actually implement the reductions, even as the population learns what
the real effects of the measures would be on them. Under current
circumstances, politicians can argue that higher energy prices are a
result of the operation of the laws of supply and demand in the marketplace. But if markedly higher prices or energy use restrictions were
imposed by politicians for the purpose of reducing global warming,
they would be faced with a much more difficult situation.
It is difficult to see why politicians would be willing to force their
constituents to adopt unpopular and expensive constraints on their
activities, or why many of their constituents would not pursue every
available loophole or alternative avenue to avoid observing the constraints that are imposed. In the case of type (2) measures, grandmothers may not agree that trips to see their grandchildren on the
opposite coast can be dispensed with, particularly if politicians (and
their possible future environmentalist supporters) do not fully explain
in advance the degree of sacrifice that would be required. If the esti-
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mates of “needed” reductions in GHG emissions discussed in Part
III.C, above, are correct, it appears unlikely that all the reductions
could be implemented in type (1) ways but would require use of some
type (2) measures as well. In other words, effective action under the
Kyoto approach appears to assume that individual citizens would cooperate in ways that would involve significant sacrifices of personal
freedom to choose.
Although global warming is perceived as the world's single largest
environmental problem in the spring of 2007 by about one-third the
U.S. population (and double the number who gave it the top ranking
in 2006), there is little consensus as to what should actually be done
105
about it. Global warming has all the psychological characteristics (a
long time horizon in human terms, uncertainty, familiarity with temperature changes, and no clear and visible effects that constantly remind people that there is a problem that needs to be solved) that are
106
likely to keep it at a low priority level. Elke Weber, of the Center for
Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University, also believes that there are underlying psychological reasons why global
107
warming does not scare people.
The economic costs of the large
GHG emissions reductions required to meet current interpretations
of UNFCCC goals would be enormous—so much so that very few
countries would willingly undertake them, particularly if all countries
108
did not.
Achievement is unlikely to occur given the difficulty of instituting and using weak international bureaucratic systems to cope
with strong economic incentives to use fossil fuel energy and other
processes that release GHGs.

105

Juliet Eilperin & Jon Cohen, Growing Number of Americans See Warming as Leading Threat, Most Want U.S. to Act, but There Is No Consensus on How, WASHINGTON POST,
April 20, 2007. The survey reported in the Post article found that only one in five favor
higher taxes on electricity to encourage conservation, and about a third support
higher gasoline taxes. Sixty-two percent of those surveyed say the government should
require power plants to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Forty-two percent think
the government should require greater fuel efficiency for vehicles, and thirty-six percent want to require manufacturers to produce more efficient air conditioners, refrigerators, and other appliances. See also Andrew C. Revkin, Yelling 'Fire' on a Hot Planet,
N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 4, at 14 (reporting on the unassuming urgency of the
global warming problem).
106
Id.
107
Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term
Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103 (2006) (exploring the phenomenon of humans’ risk perception of climate problems).
108
See infra Part V.A for a discussion of the economic costs.
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Because of very slow response times by many components of the
earth’s climate, the effects of GHG emission reductions will be a long
time coming and will only gradually affect those changes that have already occurred. Proponents argue that the Kyoto Protocol is a useful
first step down a long road, but given the larger picture, it seems reasonable to ask whether it is sufficient if the stabilization of GHG levels
in the atmosphere and therefore the mitigation of global warming are
not likely to meet current interpretations of UNFCCC goals.
In many ways, the Kyoto approach to global warming assumes that
CO2 and other GHGs are just another set of pollutants that need to be
controlled. The approach taken in the Kyoto Protocol is the rollback
approach used often in many previous pollution control efforts.
Where reasonably priced alternatives exist or the costs of nonuse are
not prohibitive, this approach has indeed worked well in many developed countries for other pollution problems. But because of the central role that fossil fuel use plays in modern civilization and that GHGs
play in Earth’s climate, GHGs are not just another set of pollutants.
GHG emissions control therefore requires a careful reexamination of
what it is that is to be achieved and what is the best means for doing
so. The pollutant control approach is not only unlikely to succeed but
is also extremely expensive as well as probably not meeting econo109
mists’ larger objective of maximizing human welfare.
5. Lack of Effective International Enforcement
or Payment Mechanism
Voluntary international agreements often do not have much of a
history of success. Even if there should be a follow-on to Kyoto, it appears unlikely that that it would be any more successful. The reason
for this is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a mecha110
nism for ensuring compliance with any global scheme adopted.
And without an assurance of effective penalties or other incentives,
there will be overwhelming incentives for nations to “free ride” on
111
contributions by others.
Kyoto does not effectively address this

109

See infra Part V.A for a discussion of the economics involved.
See Lee Lane, Reflections on Transatlantic Climate Policy, paper presented at Symposium on Climate Policy in the Coming Phases of the Kyoto Process: Targets, Instruments, and the Role of Cap and Trade Schemes, Brussels, February 20-21, 2006
(on file with author).
111
See Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW &
110
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problem for participating Annex I countries or for others. Presumably, the reason is that there was no way to do so. The idea that “moral
shame” will somehow persuade large CO2 emitters like the United
States, India, or China to undertake costly and politically painful mitigation efforts appears highly dubious. But without strong international penalties or incentives, any Kyoto follow-on is equally likely to
flounder at the cost of the additional time that it will take for this to
become apparent to everyone involved. Presumably one way to provide incentives to the less developed countries would be to offer large
incentive payments from the major economic powers. But who would
be willing to provide them, given the “free rider” problem? The
United States is not known for high levels of foreign aid, the budget
category that these expenditures are likely to be lumped into, and
which already is being used to further many other objectives. It appears equally unlikely that the participating Annex I countries would
be willing to foot the bill by themselves.
6. Lack of Support from Major GHG Emitters
The lack of support by the United States and the lack of emissions
reductions required of the rapidly growing countries of Asia pretty
much doom the Kyoto Protocol in its present form from playing any
meaningful role in controlling climate change. Without active GHG
emissions reductions by at least India, China, and the United States, it
is extremely doubtful that anything meaningful can be achieved. One
reason that the United States is not participating is the lack of a contribution from the other two countries. This argues that the cause of
global climate control would be better served by substituting a different approach based on incentives rather than governmental coercion,
a sharing of the burden based on past and present contributions to
the problems, and the ability to use a wider array of technological approaches to solve the problems. The advantage of incentives is that
those faced with the lowest cost of control would do the controlling,
rather than those who happen to have been allocated the most stringent quotas. Coercion is likely to result in more resistance than progress. And contributions based on the share of the problem caused
would make the rationale explicit and possibly even “equitable.”

ECON. 349, 358 (2003) (recognizing the importance of increasing countries’ participation in reducing GHG emissions).
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7. Weak Basic Rationale
One of the basic problems with the Kyoto Protocol is the lack of a
careful rationale for the approach used. This appears to be one of the
reasons that the United States has rejected participating in it. Viewed
as a purely technical issue, the damages from CO2 emissions are
caused by the additional emissions to the atmosphere. A good case
can be made that any emissions of CO2, past or present, have had
roughly the same adverse effects since the time that CO2 concentrations exceeded “normal” levels. Although CO2 is lost each year, pri112
marily to the oceans, it now appears that this has adverse effects too.
A rough cut at an “equitable” system to allocate damages might be to
calculate the total incremental anthropogenic CO2 emissions since the
diversion from “normal” levels for each country. This would result in
the largest allocations to those countries with the greatest and longest
standing emissions, but it would not exempt developing countries either.
Instead, Kyoto completely exempts developing countries and sets
what appear to be arbitrary limits on emissions from developed countries. The “equitable” system just discussed would place a significant
penalty on developing countries with large emissions and encourage
them to cut their emissions while still placing the major burden on
countries with substantial and longstanding emissions (like the United
States). Although estimates of these previous emissions are inherently
uncertain, it appears possible to make useable estimates and therefore
country allocations. This approach would at least create a credible rationale for the allocation of the costs of climate control between countries.
8. Partial Exclusion of Nuclear Power and Exclusion of
International Aviation and Shipping Fuels
The Kyoto Protocol excludes nuclear energy under two of the
three “flexibility mechanisms” that can be used by participating Annex
I nations to meet their commitments. Nuclear power is one of the few
possible substitutes for fossil fuel power to supply base load power, so

112

See ROYAL SOCIETY, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC
CARBON DIOXIDE: POLICY DOCUMENT 12/05 25-30 (2005), available at http://
www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=13539 (studying the effects of atmospheric
CO2 on ecosystems in the oceans).
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giving it second-class status further constrains the possible solutions to
the climate change problem.
The Protocol also excludes any consideration of emissions from
international aviation and shipping fuels. International aviation and
shipping are both growing sources of GHG emissions, and their exclusion places an increased burden on the remaining sources.
9. A Brief Summary Concerning the Kyoto Protocol
Few voluntary international agreements have been successful in
meeting their goals. Goals that can only be met with the active cooperation of most of the world’s governments and people, including
those that have not participated in the agreements or have not made
any commitments to actively contribute, are particularly unlikely to be
met. Agreements that have no effective enforcement mechanism are
even less likely to succeed, especially when everyone has an interest
not to cooperate. The Kyoto approach in general and the Kyoto Protocol in particular appear to be highly unlikely ways to meet worldwide goals for reducing GHG emissions in a timely or effective way.
These goals are very demanding, and there is no reason to believe that
the Kyoto approach would be an exception to previous experiences
with voluntary international agreements.
IV. SOME ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING
CLIMATE CHANGE
If the Kyoto Protocol—or even the Kyoto approach—will not prevent climate change or even mitigate it to the extent envisioned, and
prevention or mitigation is something that humans want to achieve,
what are some of the other tools available to control climate change,
and how should they be evaluated? In order to answer this question,
it is important to first examine the criteria to be used in determining
the answer. Part I.A outlined the proposed evaluation criteria; this
Part discusses the primary remedies, tools, and approaches that have
received some attention and that are to be evaluated in this Article.
A. Nonstabilized “Business-As-Usual” Carbonization and Adaptation (R1)
This “remedy” assumes that no significant changes will be made to
the current situation in which GHGs continue to be released into the
atmosphere as rapidly as in the recent past and few are removed ex-
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cept through natural processes. This means increases in atmospheric
CO2 levels of two to three parts per million per year.
B. Kyoto Management Plus Conventional Decarbonization Technology (R2)
This remedy assumes continuation of the management approach
provided by the Kyoto Protocol, but that only “conventional” technological approaches (TA1) plus nuclear power (which Kyoto does not
encourage) are used to control climate change.
C. Nonconventional Decarbonization or Sequestration (R2a)
1. CO2 Sequestration
Several alternatives have been proposed to increase the absorp113
tion of CO2 from the atmosphere by plants.
CO2, and presumably
other GHGs, can also be artificially removed from the atmosphere and
directly stored in a number of places. In addition, CO2 can be removed from fossil fuel-burning emissions before reaching the atmosphere. This last option may not constitute geoengineering as the
term is used elsewhere since it can be viewed as source mitigation, but
this distinction will be ignored in this discussion.
a. Using Artificial Sequestration (RC)
A number of ideas have been suggested for the artificial sequestration of CO2, including terrestrial, nonbiological sinks located in a
number of geological formations (including depleted oil and gas
fields, deep coal beds, and deep saline aquifers). In addition, there is
the possibility of oceanic nonbiological sinks, using very deep areas of
the oceans. Finally, there is the possibility of neutralizing the acidity
of the carbonic acid resulting from dissolving CO2 in water and dispos114
ing of the neutralized compounds into the ocean.

113

See generally Keith, supra note 17, at 259-68 (reviewing various proposals to manipulate the climate, including increasing the amount of outgoing infrared radiation
or increasing albedo); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC],
CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS AND TECHNICAL SUMMARY 1, 2 (Bert Metz et al. eds, 2005), available at http://arch.rivm.nl/env/
int/ipcc/pages_media/SRCCS-final/ccsspm.pdf (describing how CO2 capture and
storage could help mitigate climate change).
114
See Greg H. Rau et al., Enhanced Carbonate Dissolution as a Means of Capturing and
Sequestering Carbon Dioxide, 2001 FIRST NATIONAL CONF. CARBON SEQUESTRATION 1-4,
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b. Enhancing Natural Sequestration (RD/RE)
Although a wide variety of proposals have been made, the principal proposals for terrestrial biological sinks involve intensive management of forests or other terrestrial ecosystems to stimulate their
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere beyond what would otherwise
take place naturally. The principal proposals for natural oceanic sequestration involve fertilizing the ocean surface with phosphate or
iron in order to stimulate algae growth by supplying a biologically lim115
iting nutrient (RE).
Some of the algae will ultimately fall to the
ocean floor as organic matter, carrying carbon absorbed from the atmosphere with them. More algae falling mean more carbon sequestered.
D. Engineered Climate Selection or Changing Earth’s Radiation
Balance Directly (R3)
To the extent that there is a need for preventing or mitigating
only the temperature-related effects of global warming, there is strong
evidence that this can be done by altering Earth’s radiation balance.
This was discussed as long ago as 1979 by Freeman Dyson and Gregg
116
Marland and perhaps most prominently by a 1992 National Acad117
emy of Sciences global change panel, which noted what appeared to
the panelists to be its surprisingly great practicality. Other scientists
118
have recently expressed interest. There are a variety of proposals to
change the world’s temperatures by altering either the heat coming
into the earth from the sun or changing the amount of heat reradiated back into space from the earth. It is important to note that this
approach differs from the previous ones in that GHG levels in the atavailable at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/01/carbon_seq/p24.pdf
(describing the process of enhanced carbonate dissolution).
115
See generally Ben Fertig, Ocean Gardening Using Iron Fertilizer (Aug. 2004),
http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/oceangard/overview.php (exploring the idea of
using iron to sequester CO2).
116
Freeman J. Dyson & Gregg Marland, Technical Fixes for the Climatic Effects of CO2,
in U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WORKSHOP ON THE GLOBAL EFFECTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE
FROM FOSSIL FUELS (Report No. CONF-770385, 1979).
117
See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 18, at 100-09 (discussing the science of altering the heat balance through radiative forcing and radiative feedback mechanisms).
118
See Broad, supra note 6, at F1 (describing the increasing populatiry of the sulfate aerosol proposal); Hanley, supra note 6, at A9 (reporting also on the method of
sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to slow warming); Wigley, supra note 6, at 452 (proposing the use of sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere to provide time for humans to
mitigate warming through reductions in greenhouse gas emissions).
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mosphere are not directly altered. Only three of these proposals will
be discussed here in order to simplify the discussion, but it is highly
likely that there are others of equal or greater merit that have or will
be proposed. So these proposals should be viewed as illustrative of the
possibilities available and not as a definitive list.
119
The Livermore papers suggested and explored the feasibility of
engineered climate selection approaches to altering Earth’s radiation
balance to affect climate. To counteract global warming, Teller et al.
advocate allowing a little more of Earth’s thermal radiation to pass out
of the earth and/or allowing a little less of the sun’s thermal radiation
120
in.
To counter global cooling, they suggest allowing a little less of
Earth’s thermal radiation out and/or a little more of the sun’s in.
This discussion concerns only a few of these proposals, which will be
referred to as “radiative forcing” in this Article, and is intended to in-

119

Edward Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization: Practical Physics-Based Approaches
to Prevention of Climate Change 1, 1 (Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab.,
Preprint UCRL-JC-148012, 2002) [hereinafter Teller, Practical Physics-Based Approaches],
available at http://www.llnl.gov/globalwarm/148012.pdf (preferring active technical
management of the radiative forcing of the temperatures of the earth’s fluid envelopes
over the administrative management of atmospheric greenhouse gas inputs); Edward
Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization: Presently-Feasible Albedo-Control Approaches to Prevention of Both Types of Climate Change, Presentation to the Tyndall
Centre and Cambridge-MIT Institute Symposium on Macro-Engineering Options for
Climate Change Management, at slides 4-6 (Jan. 7-9, 2004), [hereinafter Teller, Active
Climate Stabilization], available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/events/past_events/active.pdf
(proposing the use of radiative forcing of Earth’s temperatures); Edward Teller et al.,
Global Warming and Ice Ages: I. Prospects for Physics-Based Modulation of Global Change 1, 1
(Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., Preprint UCRL-JC-128715, 1997), [hereinafter Teller et al., Physics-Based Modulation], available at http://www.llnl.gov/globalwarm/231636.pdf (proposing the use of scatterers to reduce the effects of GHGs); Edward Teller et al., Long-Range Weather Prediction and Prevention of Climate Catastrophes: A
Status Report 1, 3-8 (Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., Preprint UCRL-JC135414, 1999), [hereinafter Teller et al., Long-Range Weather Prediction], available at
http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/236324.pdf (reporting on the progress
of high technology forecasting, such as isolation modulation, as a means to address
global warming); Lowell Wood, Earth Albedo Engineering: A Rio ConventionIndicated Approach to Mesoscale Climate Stabilization as Atmospheric CO2 Levels Rise
Toward the “Agricultural Optimum”, Presentation to the Energy and Environment
Study Group, at slides 8-14 (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wood,
Earth Albedo Engineering] (exploring the technical options available for modifying
Earth’s albedo); Lowell Wood, Geoengineering: Albedo Modulation Approaches to
Preferred Climates as the Atmospheric CO2 Level Rises Towards the ‘Agricultural Optimum’ Energy Modeling Forum’s Workshop on Critical Issues in Climate Change,
Snowmass, CO, July 26-Aug. 4, 2005 [hereinafter Wood, Geoengineering].
120
See Teller et al., Global Warming and Ice Ages, supra note 21, at 9-12 (describing
the use of scatterers to cool the climate in a way similar to the emission of sulfur particles from volcanic eruptions).
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clude the most attractive proposals found in the Livermore papers involving the stratosphere and space.
1. Dispersing Sulfate Particles into the Stratosphere (RF)
As discussed previously in Part II.G.4, it is clear that sulfurcontaining gases that reach the upper atmosphere from major vol121
canic eruptions cool the planet.
Human dispersion of such gases,
presumably in a more optimized formulation, should have the same
effect. Such approaches have been discussed in the Livermore papers,
122
by the National Academy of Sciences, and most recently by P.J.
123
Crutzen.
2. Optimized Radiative Forcing Using the Stratosphere (RG)
The idea in Remedy G is to add “optimized” particles to the stratosphere that would affect various parts of the thermal radiation passing
124
through it.
The authors of the Livermore papers suggest using particular types of very fine particles that would reduce the amount of ultraviolet light striking the earth’s surface, and offer a number of sug-

121

See Alan Robock, Volcanic Eruptions, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL ENVIRONCHANGE 738, 741 (Michael C. MacCracken & John S. Perry eds. 2002), available at http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/EGECVolcanicEruptions.pdf (“Global
sulfur emission by volcanoes to the troposphere is about 14% of the total natural and
anthropogenic emission, thereby leading to a cooling influence at the surface.”).
122
See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 18, at 448-54 (proposing the use of sulfuric
acid aerosol to mimic the effects of radiation-reducing screens produced by volcanic
aerosols).
123
See Crutzen, supra note 6, at 212 (describing the use of “sunlight reflecting
aerosol in the stratosphere”).
124
For the most recent such proposal, see Teller et al., Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119. For global warming prevention, Teller et al. propose:
• Controlled scattering of incoming sunlight back into space, by sub-microscopic
minimum-feature-size
• Dielectrics-–e.g., [about 1 million tons per year of] ~ 100 nm sulfate aerosolspherules [σ~V2 << λ6]
• Metals-–e.g., [about 0.05 millions per year of] “‘UV chaff,’” super-P metal
balloon-ettes
• Resonant scatterers-–e.g., [about 0.5 million tons per year of coated dye
molecules] fluorescence options: strato-heating; brighter photosynthetic
bands].
Id. at 8. For global cooling prevention they propose:
• ‘[Long wave infrared chaff]’: 10 μm mesh Al screen & 0.1 μm ‘ribs’ . . .
• Semiconductor (e.g., Si)-walled super-P balloon-ettes . . . pass optical insolation; reflect Earth-sourced [long wave infrared] . . . .
Id. at 13.
MENTAL
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gestions as to how they would be inserted into the stratosphere. The
Livermore papers further argue that variations in the latitude where
the substances are dispersed would make it possible to change global
temperature distributions if desired, although this proposal is not part
of the remedy considered here and could raise significant issues of
who would lose and who would gain.
3. Optimized Radiative Forcing Using Space-Based Deflector (RH)
Some of the earlier Livermore papers also describe another op125
tion involving the positioning of a specialized deflector between the
earth and the sun designed to change the amount of sunlight reaching the earth. The authors believe that this could be built in a very
flexible manner to allow for either increasing or decreasing the
sunlight reaching Earth as required.
V. A COMPARISON OF SOME OF THE ALTERNATIVES FOR
CONTROLLING CLIMATE CHANGE
It is surprising how little attention has been given to engineered
climate selection approaches to global temperature control involving
changing Earth’s radiation balance, given the widely reported problems with the more “conventional” approaches. With a few exceptions, these geoengineering approaches have generally been ignored,
126
dismissed out of hand, or, at best, recommended for more research.

125

Technically, the deflector would be ideally placed at the L-1 (Lagrange 1) point
between the earth and the sun and could be moved as needed from slightly off (to
prevent ice ages) to directly on (to prevent global warming) the Earth-Sun line. The
L-1 point is a point in space on a direct line between the earth and the sun, 1.5 million
kilometers away from Earth. At that point, the gravity of the earth is balanced with that
of the sun in such a way that anything placed there will, if gently nudged back into
place every twenty-five days or so, orbit the sun once every year. This means that it will
remain directly between Earth and Sun with almost no fuel expenditure. Currently
there is a solar observatory satellite called SOHO there. The more technical specifications of this option, as proposed in Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119,
at 10, are:
• Total mass of 3,000 T emplaced over 100 yrs.—zero maintenance
4
2
• 1 Shuttle-launch per year of construction mass (10 km area) [– Area of
4
2
10 km ]
• ‘Raw’ –cf. 10 MT previous design; ~0.01 MT ‘dressed’
• ~30 μm-pitch (e.g., Al) metal screen-–with ~25 nm ‘ribs.’
126
See Allenby, supra note 2, at 8-10 (lamenting the rejection of technological solutions to global climate change). One example can be found in IPCC, WORKING
GROUP III, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION: TECHNICAL SUMMARY (Rajenda
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Although more research would be desirable, enough is known to suggest many of the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches.
Some of the less attractive proposals are accorded only brief attention
here. It should be noted, however, that the costs and benefits of various specific opportunities to reduce global warming vary considerably
even within a single option, so that there may be “attractive” opportunities within remedies that do not appear to be generally attractive.
A. Nonstabilized “Business-As-Usual” Carbonization and Adaptation (R1)
and Kyoto Using Conventional Decarbonization Technology (R2)
Remedy 1 (R1) is assumed to be the base case in this analysis, so
that the benefits and costs of this “remedy” are assumed to be zero.
Given the likely ineffectiveness of R2, R1 currently appears to be the
most probable approach that the world will follow, primarily as a result of inertia and the perceived lack of an imminent disaster. As outlined in Part II.H, this appears likely to result in increasing atmospheric CO2 levels, increasing ocean acidity, and rising global
temperatures.
A number of the characteristics of R2 (shown as Remedy B in Table 2 and Figure 1) have already been discussed extensively in Part III,
supra, since the emphasis under the Kyoto approach is what I have defined as “conventional” approaches. The results of some of the others, such as those discussed above in Part IV.C, could theoretically be
counted under the Protocol, but are not usually actively considered
for major roles in implementing it. One of the most apparent aspects
of the “conventional” approach is that the outcome is uncertain since
it depends not only on what actions various governments and individuals actually take, but also on how the resulting changes in emissions affect global temperatures. Current discussions of implementing Kyoto usually center around the use of a “cap-and-trade”
approach, which has a good chance of minimizing the costs involved
due to the inherent efficiency of using economic incentives. But since
the methods to be used are necessarily unknown, the results are also
Pachavri ed., 2001), which has a very brief and general discussion of geoengineering
approaches. It states that “although there appear to be possibilities” for it,
human understanding of the system is still rudimentary. The prospects of unanticipated consequences are large, and it may not even be possible to engineer the regional distribution of temperature, precipitation, etc. Geoengineering raises scientific and technical questions as well as many ethical,
legal, and equity issues. And yet, some basic inquiry does seem appropriate.
Id. at 43.
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uncertain and hard to predict—clearly a disadvantage of these conventional approaches relative to those involving changing Earth’s radiation balance, since they should yield much more direct control
over global temperatures. In summary, Remedy 2 does poorly against
most of the criteria, since it has negative efficiency, low cost effectiveness, poor environmental outcome, little equity, little flexibility to
meet new conditions or possible global cooling, and places a great
burden on participation and compliance. As noted in Part III, the
current indications concerning implementability are not too encouraging.
The costs of implementing this approach are very much dependent on how rapidly the GHG emissions mitigation efforts are assumed
to be implemented and on the percentage reductions assumed to be
needed. Charles Kolstad and Michael Toman argue that marginal
control costs increase with the percentage of carbon emissions controlled and may exceed $400 per ton for percentages in the range of
127
18% to 31% depending on the regions of the world involved. Since
considerably more control would be required to stabilize temperatures, their study would suggest that marginal costs would exceed $400
per ton. Carolyn Fischer and Richard Morgenstern analyze eleven different studies and also find that control costs increase with the per128
centage reduction in carbon emissions.
For abatement above 25%,
marginal costs range from just under $50 to $350 per ton in the
United States.
The reason that marginal costs vary with how rapidly mitigation is
undertaken is that controlling GHG emissions can be undertaken
most economically when the equipment that is producing the emissions needs to be replaced for other reasons. If the replacement is
undertaken on a hurried or urgent basis without regard to these other
reasons for replacement, the cost is much higher than those indicated
earlier in this Section. If the replacement occurs for other reasons,
the marginal cost is only the added cost of the GHG reduction features of the new equipment. If, however, the current equipment
would otherwise not need to be replaced, then the entire cost of the
replacement should be counted against the cost of controlling GHGs.
127

Charles D. Kolstad & Michael Toman, The Economics of Climate Policy (Res. for
the Future, Discussion Paper No. 00-40 REV, 2001), available at http://www.rff.org/
rff/Documents/RFF-DP-00-40.pdf.
128
Carolyn Fischer & Richard D. Morgenstern, Carbon Abatement Costs: Why the
Range of Estimates? 9 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-42 REV, 2005),
available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-03-42-REV.pdf.
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When one is dealing with tens of thousands of very expensive thermal
electric power plants or hundreds of millions of motor vehicles or
hundreds of millions of home heating and air conditioning units, urgent replacement quickly becomes astronomically expensive. It is assumed in this Article that marginal costs are likely to be $50 to $400
per ton carbon. Lasky reviews a large number of cost studies that
129
show estimated costs in this general range. Although it is not always
clear whether estimates are based on long-term replacement costs
(just the added cost of replacing high-emission components with lowemission ones), most available estimates appear to be so based. One
of the most comprehensive recent studies of actual opportunities for
130
reducing emissions quotes costs of $100 per ton carbon.
John
Deutch and Ernest Moniz estimate that a carbon tax of about $100 per
ton carbon would equalize the cost of electricity from nuclear, coal,
131
and gas sources.
This is significant, given that nuclear is one of the
few technologies currently available that can substitute for fossil fuelbased base load power plants.
Although it carries its own environmental risks, there may well be
a tradeoff that would have to be made between the risks of CO2 emissions and nuclear power. Reuel Shinnar and Francesco Citro estimate
that a carbon tax equivalent to $155 to $160 per ton carbon would be
132
required to achieve a 70% reduction in CO2 emissions over 30 years.
An earlier study found that stabilizing global CO2 emissions would re133
quire a carbon tax in the range of $200.
The important point here
is not the upper bound (which depends on both the speed of mitigation and the percentage reduction, and could rapidly reach astronomical levels under extreme cases) but rather that the marginal cost
is not likely to be less than $50 per ton of carbon removed.

129

Mark Lasky, The Economic Costs of Reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases: A Survey
of Economic Models (Cong. Budget Office, Technical Paper Series No. 2003-3, 2003),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4198/2003-3.pdf.
130
Robert Socolow, Keynote Address at the Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation
of Greenhouse Gases, Stabilization Wedges: Mitigation Tools for the Next HalfCentury, (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.stabilisation2005.com/day3/Socolow.pdf.
131
See John M. Deutch & Ernest J. Moniz, The Nuclear Option, 295 SCI. AM. 76, 81
(2006) (showing how a $100 per ton carbon tax would raise coal and gas prices to
seven cents per kilowatt-hour, reaching parity with nuclear power costs).
132
Shinnar & Citro, Supporting Online Material for A Road Map to U.S. Decarbonization, supra note 89, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/313/
5791/1243/DC1.
133
ALAN S. MANNE & RICHARD G. RICHELS, BUYING GREENHOUSE INSURANCE: THE
ECONOMIC COSTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS LIMITS 62 (1992).
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Based on a broad review of the literature, Professor Richard Tol
concludes that marginal benefits of carbon dioxide control of $15 per
ton “seem justified,” and $50 or more per ton “cannot be defended
134
with our current knowledge.”
But based on Tol’s review, the net
benefits appear to be negative and probably strongly negative for
Remedy B. Although the approach, methodology, and values given by
Nordhaus are different, his conclusions appear broadly consistent
with Tol’s findings since he finds that the benefit-cost ratio for the
135
Protocol is 1/7.
On the other hand, the 2006 Stern Review reaches a
very positive conclusion with regard to the net benefits of a regulatory
136
decarbonization proposal. It appears, however, that the Review used
137
a much-below-market interest rate and apparently ignored the large
costs of public information and advertising campaigns to encourage
the public to pursue energy conservation and to explain to them how
138
to do so.
Neither of these assumptions appears justifiable and also
has the effect of greatly reducing the costs relative to the benefits of
the program they analyzed. The Review also assumed stabilization at
550 ppm CO2e, which is unlikely to limit temperature increases to
o 139
2 C and reduces the cost of the program compared to lower stabilization levels that have a greater likelihood of limiting the increases.
At the same time, it must be emphasized that both Tol’s benefit
estimates and the cost estimates used in this subsection are far from
precise or generally accepted. Although they may well be the best
currently available, the uncertainties are substantial. Readers are
therefore encouraged to use this analysis as a way of thinking about
the problem rather than as the last word on each of the values used.
One difference between Remedy B and the others is that B might
result in reduced use of petroleum (depending on which actual re-

134

Richard S.J. Tol, The Marginal Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions 4 (July 7,
2003) available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/carboncost/
pdf/tol.pdf.
135
William Nordhaus & Joseph G. Boyer, Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of
the Kyoto Protocol, 1999 ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COSTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL) 93, 93, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/Kyoto.pdf.
136
See STERN, supra note 3, at 236 (“This resources-cost analysis suggests that a
globally rational world should be able to tackle climate change at low cost.”).
137
See Shots Across the Stern, supra note 5, at 80 (citing Nordhaus’s claim that the
economics “are absurd”).
138
I received this information from a personal discussion with a Stern Review staff
member.
139
See Hare & Meinshausen, supra note 97, at 112 (noting that the European Union has set a global goal of not exceeding preindustrial warming levels above 2°C).
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ductions in fossil fuel use were actually implemented). Since the later
remedies on the list do not involve reducing energy use, it may be reasonable to include such benefits under Remedy B to the extent that
petroleum use would actually be reduced. Presumably these benefits
would primarily involve increased security resulting from decreased
reliance on insecure or unstable sources of petroleum. It is nearly
impossible to estimate these benefits because it is difficult to estimate
the extent to which reductions in petroleum use would be used to
meet Kyoto goals, the extent of the increased energy security, or its
value. But these benefits of Remedy B should be considered significant, although nonquantified.
It should be noted that there are almost certainly some low-cost
“conventional” opportunities in a wide range of areas, and some of
them might even be comparable to some of the low-cost geoengineering options discussed above. There may even be some “conventional”
opportunities where the private benefits exceed the private costs, although economists argue that they would have already been implemented in a perfectly competitive world if they were known to exist.
The cost estimates shown in Table 2, Row B, infra, should be regarded
as an attempt to bound the marginal costs needed to achieve the goals
of the UNFCCC as interpreted by the EU. In other words, what is the
cost of the most expensive “conventional” remedy that would have to
be used to result in goal achievement (presumably that needed to
o
limit temperature rise to 2 C) where the lower-cost remedies are used
first? Because the CO2 reductions under this option or remedy are
varied and unpredictable given the learning curve that would undoubtedly evolve should implementation be attempted, there is no
engineering estimate that can be made as to what the marginal cost
would be. Rather, such estimates are at best guesstimates based often
on model simulations. By contrast, most of the other options or
remedies considered in this Article can be more reliably estimated using engineering cost estimates, since somewhat similar technologies
are likely to be used on each project that might be implemented. Accordingly, the full range of estimated costs is shown for each of the
140
other remedies, rather than the marginal cost.
To the extent that there exist low-cost opportunities to lower GHG
emissions using conventional means, these options are certainly worth
pursuing. Although this will not be mentioned further, it almost goes

140

However, a dotted vertical line has been added to Remedy B in Figure 1 to
show the full range of costs.
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without saying. However, it appears highly unlikely, given the currently available research on marginal costs, that enough low-cost opportunities exist to meet the GHG reduction goals. Substituting more
efficient light bulbs and reducing the power needed to keep appliances instantly available, if indeed these are very low-cost options, can
only reduce GHG emissions a limited amount. But it is economically
rational to pursue any energy efficiency project that can be justified in
terms of the benefits of reducing the nontemperature effects of
GHGs. Since the temperature effects can be controlled at very low
cost using other options, these effects are unlikely to justify more than
the lowest cost conventional measures.
Remedy 2 is particularly ill suited to situations where there is likely
to be any significant change in the urgency of remedial actions because of the huge costs involved and the lengthy delays that would be
needed to adjust the time frames, the country quotas, the particular
regulations and incentives, and the actual investments by each individual country, industry, and individual. So to the extent that reducing climate change may be urgent (such as might be the case if there
were an abrupt climate change due to a volcanic eruption or other
cause), the conventional approach to reducing it becomes even less
attractive than it otherwise would be, and perhaps even useless in the
extreme case.
B. Nonconventional Decarbonization or Sequestration (R2a)
In general, CO2 sequestration offers slightly more flexibility than
the conventional approaches since implementation requires only initial agreement among those nations involved and individual citizens
do not have to make decisions contrary to their immediate selfinterest. But it is nevertheless difficult to see how it could be effectively used to respond to abrupt changes in conditions, particularly to
counteract global cooling.
1. Artificial Sequestration (RC)
When using artificial sequestration, one difficulty is that fossil fuelgenerated energy is often required, which generates more CO2 and
results in a lower net reduction. The costs of underground and oceanic injection (Remedy C) appear to be higher than many of the
other remedies. The costs of carbonate dissolution in seawater, one of
the lesser-known options, may be lower than those shown if the CO2
source is located on the ocean and there is a nearby source of lime-
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stone. Greg Rau et al. quote costs as low as $25 to $160 per ton car141
bon in these favorable circumstances.
In those cases where concentrated CO2 is sequestered it may be possible to release it fairly rapidly
if global cooling threatened.
2. Enhancing Natural Sequestration (RD/RE)
The costs of intensive forestry (Remedy D) appear to be broadly
similar but possibly higher than the “conventional” approaches. The
approach offers very little flexibility to the extent that trees are involved because of their long life span, although it would presumably
be possible to burn the trees if cooling threatened.
The costs of oceanic fertilization with minerals or nutrients such
as iron (Remedy E) appear to be substantially lower than GHG mitigation but more than Remedies G and H. The impacts on the plant and
animal life of the oceans is an area of concern but would presumably
be generally positive since phytoplankton form the basis for most of
the oceanic food chain. Most of the (relatively small scale) open
ocean experiments carried out so far appear to support the general
142
concept, but have not always yielded encouraging results as to the
ratio of the observed amount of carbon exported to the deep ocean
143
per amount of iron supplied.
One estimate is that dumping huge
amounts of iron into large swaths of the sea would absorb no more
144
than 3% of annual CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning.
New research, however, indicates that the ratio observed in nature may be an
145
order of magnitude higher.
Although the implications of this new
research for the use of Remedy E have not been worked out, it does
suggest that much higher ratios are theoretically possible by using
146
lower concentrations of iron and possibly adding other nutrients. It
141

Greg H. Rau et al., Poster Presentation at First National Conference on Carbon
Sequestration: Enhanced Carbonate Dissolution as a Means of Capturing and Sequestering Carbon Dioxide 3 (May 14-17, 2001), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/
publications/proceedings/01/carbon_seq/p24.pdf.
142
A summary of the current scientific knowledge on the subject can be found in
Fertig, supra note115.
143
Quirin Schiermeier, Only Mother Nature Knows How to Fertilize the Oceans:
Natural Input of Nutrients Works Ten Times Better than Manmade Injections,
news@nature.com, April 23, 2007, http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070423/full/
070423-8.html.
144
Id.
145
Stephanie Blaine et al., Effect of Natural Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in
the Southern Ocean, 446 NATURE 1070-74 (2007).
146
Inference based on references in supra notes 143, 145.
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may be more expensive for humans to imitate nature in this way, but
on the other hand further research may reveal variations on nature’s
147
approach that would be even more efficient.
This appears to be an
extremely useful and urgent area for research.
C. Engineered Climate Selection or Changing Earth’s Radiation Balance (R3)
A major advantage of options that change Earth’s radiation balance is that they would allow global temperatures to be changed in either direction and determined relatively precisely and independently
of GHG levels. Additionally, this could be done without the necessity
for decisions by individuals against their immediate self-interest.
Global temperatures could be maintained at what may be determined
to be optimum on the basis of other criteria, while the economic advantages of higher-than-natural corresponding atmospheric CO2 levels, such as reduced control costs and increased growth of some
148
plants—including most domesticated crops —are maintained. This
has both good and bad results. It is good in that most of the adverse
effects of global warming, including almost all those commonly discussed, could be eliminated rapidly and cheaply so that there would
be no need to undertake expensive efforts to reduce GHG levels in
terms of their climatological impacts. But the use of engineered climate selection would not affect the nontemperature change impacts
of elevated GHG concentrations, which would therefore not be mitigated. So far, the most important nontemperature impact identified
149
is elevated CO2 concentrations on ocean acidification, which in time
would likely have adverse effects on calcifying marine organisms (in150
cluding corals).
The extent and importance of these effects would
therefore appear to be an important research issue in judging between the alternatives.

147

Schiermeier quotes one expert who believes that man cannot achieve nature’s
efficiency in this regard, but offers no justification for this dubious belief. Schiermeier,
supra note 143.
148
See Leanne M. Jablonski et al., Plant Reproduction Under Elevated CO2 Conditions:
A Meta-Analysis of Reports on 79 Crop and Wild Species, 156 NEW PHYTOLOGIST 9, 9-10
(2002) (citing the carbon and nitrogen allocation typical of domesticated crops as the
primary reason for its reproductive response to CO2).
149
See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 1 (“There is a growing concern that as
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 continue to rise, the increasing acidity will have
significant effects on the marine system.”).
150
See also Caspar Henderson, Paradise Lost, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 5, 2006, at 2833, for a recent summary of the effects of acidification on the oceans.
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1. Dispersing Sulfate Particles into the Stratosphere (RF)
The proof of concept for this remedy has already been provided
151
by nature and has recently been further reinforced by P.J. Crutzen.
Based on observations of the climatic effects of adding volcanic sulfur
to the stratosphere discussed previously in Part II.G, Remedy F—
adding sulfate particles to the stratosphere—would clearly be effective
against global warming (but not cooling), given the previously noted
widely accepted experience with the climatological results of major
volcanic eruptions, but could possibly be risky in terms of unintended
environmental effects on the stratosphere, especially the ozone layer.
One question, for example, is the effect of such particles on rainfall
distribution. Luke Oman et al. suggest that the 1783 eruption of the
Laki Volcano in Iceland may have resulted in a weak African and In152
dian monsoon that year.
Lowell Wood argues that particles would
be emplaced well infra the ozone layer and that there is only slow ver153
tical mixing, but does advocate “real air” measurements.
The importance of this option is that volcanic experience with this remedy
has already demonstrated its strong climatic effects.
2. Optimized Radiative Forcing Using the Stratosphere (RG)
It is very reasonable to assume that humans could greatly improve
on nature’s efforts by optimizing this last approach (Remedy F) to the
problems of global warming and cooling. The Livermore papers discuss the use of specialized materials in the stratosphere and find these
approaches to be much less expensive and more effective than the
“conventional” approach of trying to adjust the emission rates of
GHGs. In fact, they state that the net costs of at least some of their
approaches can be “strongly negative” (i.e., there would be no net
154
costs, only benefits).
This is because of benefits their approaches
may provide in other areas, such as reduced exposure to ultraviolet
radiation and thus a reduction in skin cancer, greatly increased plant
growth and agricultural productivity made possible by higher CO2 levels created by the decoupling of CO2 levels from climate, and even (if
desired) a changed distribution of the heat energy from the sun fal-

151

See Crutzen, supra note 6.
Luke Oman et al., High-Latitude Eruptions Cast Shadow over the African Monsoon
and the Flow of the Nile, 33 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L18711, at 2 (Sept. 30, 2006).
153
Wood, Geoengineering, supra note 119.
154
Teller et al., Practical Physics-Based Approaches, supra note 119, at 1.
152
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ling on various parts of the world so as to make it more even. One of
the more important additional benefits would be the ability to respond rapidly, and presumably effectively, to unanticipated and undesired changes in global temperatures in either direction, such as those
that may occur as a result of major volcanic eruptions. Remedy G analyzes the stratospheric approaches advanced in some of the recent
Livermore papers. Remedy G meets all of the criteria discussed in
Part I.A, including environmental effectiveness, and would appear,
based on the claims of its proponents, to be one of the best remedies
discussed in this Article, even though they agree some research and
development would be useful before it is actually implemented. It is
particularly strong on the very important flexibility criterion as well as
the economic ones. The only drawbacks appear to be that it does not
address the adverse effects of elevated CO2 levels on ocean acidification, that it could have possible adverse environmental impacts on the
stratosphere, and that the impacts on rainfall patterns are not well
understood (which is true of increasing CO2 levels as well).
Although precise cost calculations are difficult to make, the
equivalent cost per ton of carbon removed appears to be in the range
of two to ten cents, compared to $50 to $400 for the more conventional approaches (see Table 2 and Figure 1). This estimate is based
155
on costs presented by Wood and an assumed offset of 10 gigatons of
carbon per year, and appears to be consistent with David Keith’s 2001
156
estimate.
Even if the costs are underestimated (as sometimes happens with new technological proposals) by one or even two orders of
magnitude, the conclusions remain the same. According to its proponents, it meets the first aspect of the flexibility criterion by making
possible timely adjustments of global temperatures to “fine tune”
them towards any of the goals listed above in Part III.B. It seems to
have a better chance than any of the other options (besides Remedy
H) to control abrupt climate changes if advance agreement is reached
as to what is to be done under specified circumstances, or if rapid
agreement could be reached as to what is to be done under new circumstances. It meets the second aspect of the flexibility criterion

155

See Wood, Earth Albedo Engineering, supra note 119.
David W. Keith, Geoengineering and Carbon Management: Is There a Meaningful
Distinction?, in GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 1192, 1196-97, tbl.1B (David Williams et al. eds., 2001)
available at http://www.ucalgary.ca/~keith/papers/41.Keith.2001.GeogineeeringAnd
CarbonManagment.f.pdf (providing cost of mitigation estimates for various geoengineering methods, including space shields).
156
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concerning the ability to control both global warming and cooling.
And, according to its proponents, it even meets the third aspect of the
flexibility criterion concerning the ability (but not the necessity) to
change the geographic distribution of global temperatures. The
benefits and costs are assumed to be what the Livermore paper authors say they are, although they are very close to those provided by
157
Keith.
This may be a minor leap of faith since most of the Livermore papers are nonpeer-reviewed literature, but does not alter the
clear effectiveness of this general type of remedy, as demonstrated by
the climatic effects of major volcanic eruptions. Nordhaus argues that
several geoengineering options are of such low cost that the costs can
be ignored, so that the net benefits are roughly equal to the benefits
158
from global warming control.
Presumably this would apply to this
particular remedy, although it is not specifically mentioned by Nordhaus. On this basis, the efficiency of this remedy would appear to be
strongly positive.
Although the basic physical and engineering principles needed to
implement Remedy G appear to be on solid ground, there are many
unanswered questions concerning whether this option really has been
optimized, exactly how it would be implemented, exactly how much it
would cost, and the nature and extent of nonglobal warming environmental effects that need to be answered before actual implementation could reasonably be undertaken. Proponents agree that some research and development would be useful before it is actually
implemented. In 1999, Teller et al. suggested additional research and
development of about $100 million to further refine this remedy and
159
examine side effects; their Tyndall presentation in 2004 mentions

157

See Keith, supra note 17, at 254 (“A 1% change in reflectivity might be brought
about for about $500 million a year.” (quoting President’s Sci. Advisory Comm., Restoring the Quality of Our Environment, PSAC65 (1965))); Teller, Physics-Based Modulation,
supra note 119 (providing annual cost estimates ranging from $200 million per year for
metallic scatterers to $1 billion per year for dielectric scatterers).
158
See William D. Nordhaus, An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse
Gases, 258 SCIENCE 1315, 1317 (1992), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/
p08a/p0829.pdf (“[G]eoengineering would introduce a hypothetical technology that
provides costless mitigation of climate change. . . . Several geoengineering solutions
have extremely low economic costs compared to conventional mitigation techniques
and can therefore be treated as costless.”).
159
Teller et al., Long-Range Weather Prediction, supra note 119, at 3-4 (exploring the
potential of a subscale proof-of-concept scattering system experiment “whose presence
could be sensed and studied with sophisticated technical means but which would have
completely imperceptible climatic consequences” for under $100 million).
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160

about $1 billion.
Several of the other “nonconventional” remedies
would also require additional refinement, but Remedy G might require more than most of the others given the numerous options and
potential environmental risks that need more thorough exploration.
The authors recommend a series of trials using scaled-down quantities
to make sure that their theoretical calculations hold up in the real
world and that they have not overlooked some negative environmental effects. In the case of the stratospheric options, the effects of
these small-scale trials would be designed to dissipate in less than five
years if any should be detrimental as a result of the movement of the
materials of concern down out of the stratosphere. Therefore, in the
proponents’ view, these trials should not be considered a permanent
alteration of the stratosphere even at a small scale. These trials appear prudent and would hopefully alleviate possible concerns that this
novel approach is overly risky, as long as the approach could be abandoned when and if adverse new information is acquired. Wood lists
161
some of the research that he recommends be undertaken.
Lee
Lane, however, reports that no research is currently being undertaken
162
and recommends that it should be.
If the research and development were successful and subsequently
implemented, this approach would break the relationship between
CO2 levels and temperature. Humans could increase CO2 levels substantially, if that is otherwise the desired outcome, without incurring
most of the costs imposed by unwanted global warming. And if CO2
gets too low and/or an ice age threatens, temperatures could be rapidly increased to avert it. But it would not decrease the nontemperature effects of increased CO2 levels in the atmosphere, such as increased ocean acidification.
To date, the principal scientific attack on the Livermore papers
has come from Stephen Schneider on the grounds that varying insola163
tion and albedo would “mess up” everyone’s local (micro)climate.
160

Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119, at 15 (discussing an experimental program to explore stratospheric scatterers in subscale scoped at $1 billion).
161
Wood, Earth Albedo Engineering, supra note 119, at 16-17.
162
LEE LANE, STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR BUSH ADMINISTRATION CLIMATE POLICY 7073 (2006).
163
Email from Lowell Wood, Stanford University and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to author (July 18, 2005, 21:44 EST) (on file with author); see also
Stephen H. Schneider, Earth Systems Engineering and Management, 409 NATURE 417, 419
(2001) (“Because of the patchy nature of the greenhouse effect itself, even if we could
engineer our stratospheric aerosol injections to balance on a [global] basis the amount
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The proponents believe that research reported by Bala Govindasamy
164
on this issue provides an adequate response to this question.
Govindasamy’s paper reported on detailed modeling and argued that the
“deep modes” of the current climate system maintain at least mesoscale climates worldwide without significant alteration, as the spaceand time-averaged insolation is varied by a few percent in order to off165
set 2X or 4X increases in atmospheric CO2. The proponents believe
that Govindasamy shows that their remedies would provide reasonably
good compensation for any global warming due to higher CO2 lev166
els. The proponents have tried to anticipate and answer many other
potential criticisms of their proposals as well. A recent news report
provides some interesting insights into the motivation for the Livermore papers and the internal questioning, research such as that mentioned above, and ultimately agreement that went on within the Labo167
ratory concerning these proposals.
3. Optimized Radiative Forcing Using Space-Based Deflector (RH)
A space-based deflector is likely to take substantially longer to put
into place and to be much more expensive than stratospheric particles, but it would be just as effective in reducing incoming sunlight,
much more permanent and flexible, have fewer environmental side
168
effects, and involve lower maintenance costs.
Keith’s 2001 estimate
of [globally] averaged heat, . . . we would still be left with some regions heated to excess and others left cooler.”).
164
B. Govindasamy et al., Geoengineering Earth’s Radiation Balance To Mitigate Climate
Change from a Quadrupling of CO2, 37 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 157, 159 (2003)
(reporting that even though varying insolation and albedo causes “residual climate
change” to certain regions, “these residual climate changes are everywhere much
smaller than the change from the quadrupling of CO2 alone”).
165
See id. at 162 (“Comparison of surface temperature results by latitude band and
season indicates that a reduction in solar luminosity may largely compensate for the
impact of increased atmospheric CO2, despite the differences in the latitudinal and
seasonal pattern of these radiative forcings.”).
166
Id. at 166 (suggesting that “geoengineering may be a promising strategy for
counteracting climate change”). For additional discussion of this general issue, see
Morton, supra note 6, at 133-34.
167
Anne McIlroy, Going to Extremes To Fight Global Warming, TORONTO GLOBE &
MAIL, June 3, 2006, at A1 (describing the early debate between Edward Teller, a strong
advocate for using geoengineering to fight global warming, and Ken Caldeira, a fellow
researcher at Lawrence Livermore who was initially skeptical of Teller’s theories).
168
Keith, Geoengineering and Carbon Management, supra note 156, at 1194 (noting
that while the “possibility of shielding the earth with orbiting mirrors is the most technologically extravagant geoengineering scheme,” its costs are offset by fewer, less significant, and more predictable side effects that could be eliminated at will).
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is that the equivalent cost per ton of carbon removed is between
169
twenty cents and two dollars, although there is no evidence that this
is based on a careful engineering assessment of the problems involved. One of the more important additional benefits compared to
Remedy G would be the ability to respond even more rapidly (presumably immediately if adequate planning and coordination were accomplished ahead of time) to unanticipated changes in global temperatures, such as those that may occur as a result of major volcanic
eruptions, nuclear conflicts, or abrupt climate changes. It presumably
would also avoid most or all of the possible environmental side effects
170
that could result from placing particles in the stratosphere.
But it
would involve something beyond what has ever previously been accomplished: namely, assembling and maintaining a large structure far
out in space. Despite the recent problems with the space shuttle,
there are no obvious reasons that this could not be done, but it might
well require significant time as well as technical and other resources to
accomplish. Only a very careful engineering study could fully estimate
the costs involved. Since it would also take much longer to design,
transport, and build, one possibility might be to consider this as a possible longer term, more permanent solution that could be built during a period when optimized stratospheric particles are used to control global temperatures as an “interim” measure.
D. General Conclusions Concerning Alternatives for
Controlling Climate Change
Geoengineering is more than a little controversial, as illustrated by
the disparity in views between Schneider and Michaelson. Schneider
argues that although “adaptation alone may prove inadequate,” he
would
prefer to reduce slowly our economic dependence on carbon fuels,
rather than to try to counter the potential side effects with centuries of
injecting sulphuric acid into the atmosphere or iron into the oceans.
Laying stress instead on carbon management, with little manipulation of
biogeochemical or energy fluxes in nature, is a much less risky pros171
pect.
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See id. at 1196 tbl.B1 (providing cost of mitigation estimates for solar shields).
See id. at 1194 (noting that “solar shields effect a ‘clean’ alteration of the solar
constant” without the side effects of particle-based solutions).
171
Stephen H. Schneider, Earth Systems Engineering and Management, 409 NATURE
417, 421 (2001).
170
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Michaelson, however, argues that
the response to the claim that geoengineering “just won’t work” is to argue that such a claim is premature in practice and foolish in principle.
Of course, the case for any new technology is “uneasy,” and uncertainty
will remain up until a geoengineering project is put into place, but such
uncertainty is not sufficient reason to fail to initiate research now. Nor
can we be daunted by the prospect of vast, unforeseen secondary consequences of tampering with the Earth’s climate; again, it is too early to
tell. Caution is wisdom—but inordinate skepticism flies in the face of a
172
century of technological achievement.

Considering only temperature-related effects, it is hard to find
anything to like about Remedy B other than that it is already largely in
place in terms of its structure, at least until 2012. As outlined above in
Part III, continued substantial reliance on it is most likely to result in
173
substantial global warming because of its ineffectiveness, a dependence on individuals making decisions against their own self-interest,
and a reluctance to search for better alternatives. Remedy B also appears useless as a way to control global cooling. And the economic efficiency of this option appears to be strongly negative. The other potential remedies (other than A—no change) range somewhere
between B and G in their attractiveness. Remedies E through H appear to offer positive efficiency and to make lower demands on individuals for implementation, but have varying costs and environmental
side effects. Option G appears to be equal to or better than all the
other options under each criterion (although H offers lower environmental risks at potentially much higher costs in time and money),
so would appear, with one important footnote, to be reasonably called
a superior option for dealing with gradual global warming, despite
Schneider’s reservations concerning geoengineering options. There
are many unanswered implementation questions, however, concerning whether this option really has been optimized, exactly how it
would be implemented, precisely how much it would cost, who would
pay for it, and the nature and extent of nonglobal warming environmental effects that would need to be answered before actual implementation could reasonably be undertaken. But there would appear
to be a case for undertaking an early but limited research and development effort to answer the geoengineering implementation ques-
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Michaelson, supra note 18, at 80 (footnote omitted).
See RUDDIMAN, supra note 19, at 172-73 (describing what the world might look
like under these circumstances).
173
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tions before making large investments in any high-cost remedies that
might be undertaken under the Remedy 2. Remedy G can also be
viewed as a rapidly implemented interim measure—while longer-term
CO2 reducing remedies are put into place and become effective—and
as an emergency response measure in the case of rapid climate
changes, such as major volcanic eruptions or nuclear conflicts.
Although there is less experience with using these options than
with option B, the technical risks appear controllable through careful
experimentation. In the unlikely event that such experimentation
shows that all the permutations of option G have significant environmental side effects, this would suggest the use of option H. Rejecting
geoengineering approaches because of their remaining technical uncertainties or unfamiliarity, as Schneider does, is not a conclusion
based on careful analysis. The major footnote to this conclusion concerns mitigating the nontemperature effects of increases in GHG levels (Problem 2, as defined in Part I.B), which the radiative forcing approaches would not affect, but which will be discussed in more detail
in Part V.F.2.
The experience to date with the Kyoto Protocol has not shown
that approach to be effective in significantly reducing the growth of
GHG emissions or stabilizing atmospheric CO2 levels. There would
obviously be considerable difficulty in reaching an international
agreement to undertake geoengineering projects not covered by the
Kyoto Protocol, although the same would be true of follow-ons to the
Protocol. The advantage of the geoengineering approaches, however,
is that once agreed upon, there is no need for individual cooperation
by most of Earth’s energy-using population, as would be required for
effective, worldwide energy conservation or other mitigation efforts
on the scale that would be needed to bring CO2 emission levels back
to less than “dangerous” levels. And if (as seems almost certain) there
are major volcanic eruptions that send material into the stratosphere,
nuclear conflicts that send soot into the stratosphere, or if there is a
collapse of the ocean conveyor belt or other abrupt or unforeseen
climate changes, there would appear to be no other feasible remedy
that could effectively mitigate the effects of those events on climate.
Careful preparations for geoengineering approaches involving Remedy G may be justifiable even if they are never used for reducing
global warming, but merely as an insurance policy against abrupt adverse climate changes such as these.
Continued pursuit of only regulatory decarbonization (Remedy 2)
appears to be counterproductive given the implementation problems
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inherent in it. Unfortunately, an unintended consequence may be to
discourage consideration of more effective measures during the long
period needed for the major deficiencies of Remedy B to become evident to all. Thus, although regulatory decarbonization is strongly favored by many environmentalists, the net result of pursuing it alone
may be to postpone effective action to control global warming for as
long as it takes for the world to recognize that this approach is very
unlikely to significantly decrease atmospheric GHG levels to the extent needed to reach the EU temperature limits, or even to decrease
them at all.
E. Other Management Approaches Besides Those Already Analyzed
In Part I.C, several other possible management approaches besides those analyzed so far were briefly listed. The question now is
how the conclusions above might differ if these other management
tools were used. The analysis suggests the conclusions discussed below.
1. (MA1a) Business-as-Usual with Voluntary Decarbonization

174

This management option involves purely voluntary efforts by individuals or corporations concerned enough to do something, either
with or without public educational efforts to persuade them to do so.
This option presumably eliminates the potential political backlash
from angry constituents whose GHG-producing activities would be reduced. It should also result in the use of relatively efficient control
measures. Similarly, only those willing to be internationally less competitive would undertake such solutions, presumably eliminating its
political problems. Although such efforts are likely to have a positive
effect and deserve to be encouraged, it appears unlikely that a purely
voluntary effort would have a significant effect on one or more of the
four problems, since the effects are likely to be very small compared to
what would be required to meet the UNFCCC goals as currently interpreted. Kyoto was undertaken in large part because of a concern
that purely voluntary actions would be unlikely to meet the UNFCCC
goals. This seems unlikely to have changed.
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See supra Part.I.C.1 (discussing this approach).
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2. (MA2b) Decentralized Regulatory Decarbonization

175

If one or even a few local jurisdictions (or even single countries)
should decide to take a decentralized approach as a result of a political or judicial decision, such initiatives might result in progress toward
solving a small portion of the larger problem originating in that local
jurisdiction or jurisdictions. But unless only low-cost solutions were
imposed, the results would likely be less efficient and effective than
under the Kyoto management approach applied to the countries or
jurisdictions involved, since they would presumably be the only ones
to pursue this approach and would be limited to whatever control
measures might be available under current national laws in the case of
local jurisdictions. The costs would presumably be higher compared
to MA2a, since a locally based approach is likely to be less efficient
than one based on new national legislation tailored to minimizing the
costs of control for these particular pollutants (such as by the use of
economic incentives such as cap and trade), and a single-country solution is likely to be less efficient than one based on an international
agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol.
This does not mean, of course, that decentralized decisions could
not be used by local jurisdictions to “push” the political process at the
national level by creating costly or otherwise unpalatable alternatives
unless alternative political decisions were made at the national level.
But since most of the projected increased emissions worldwide are expected to originate in rapidly growing countries that presumably
would not be involved, it appears highly unlikely that GHG emissions
would be sufficiently reduced to meet the EU/UNFCCC goal or even
to make a noticeable change in atmospheric GHG levels using this
approach. Most of the proposals at the state and national level in the
United States assume that all the other states or countries would take
equivalent actions; if, as appears much more likely, they do not, there
would be no way to meet the EU/UNFCCC goal even if a state or
country met its goal in terms of GHG emissions reductions.
3. (MA2c) Liability-Based Regulatory Decarbonization

176

One or more countries could adopt liability laws or legal precedents that make it very expensive for companies to sell or use products
with very high GHG emissions. Unless all countries adopted them
175
176

See id.
See id.
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and had similarly effective legal institutions, the results would probably be less effective and efficient than under the Kyoto approach. Presumably only those countries with strong judicial systems, liabilitybased legal traditions, and strong motivation could effectively utilize
this approach. In addition, such an approach is unlikely to result in
the adoption of the lowest cost control options given that no one executive branch institution would coordinate the control efforts for
that purpose.
As in MA2b, however, it is entirely possible that climate change
torts could be used to “encourage” the political process to take other
actions to solve the problem. But if this process actually determined
the control measures used, the results would probably be less efficient
and effective than under the Kyoto approach, and probably less than
under MA2b. Most of the comments made above under MA2b concerning the difficulty in achieving the EU/UNFCCC goal appear to
apply.
4. (MA4) International Approach Using All Available Technologies
177
and Management Approaches
The intention here is to fashion a replacement for Kyoto that cor178
rects at least some of its major deficiencies.
The place to start is to
correct the weak rationale for Kyoto. As outlined in Part III.C.7, a
much more logical basis for such an international agreement would
be the “polluter pays” principle, as opposed to the “rollback” approach with exemptions embodied in Kyoto. Under the former approach, those countries responsible for present and past GHG emissions would pay an amount based on the lesser of the damages these
emissions have caused or will cause and the cost of solving the result179
ing problems.
Most likely, some allowance could be arranged for
countries to spend a portion of what they would owe internally for cli-

177

See id..
See supra Part III.C (discussing the major deficiencies of Kyoto).
179
A related “Brazilian” proposal was actually considered in the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol and has received some attention since. See generally, Emilio
L. La Rovere et al., The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility for Global Warming, in
BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE 157, 158
(Kevin A. Baumert et al. eds., 2002), available at http://pdf.wri.org/
opc_chapter7.pdf (describing the innovative “Brazilian” proposal, which included a
“complex methodology” for “distribut[ing] emission reduction burdens among countries—according to each country’s relative responsibility for the global temperature
increase”).
178
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mate control purposes. Where the damages and costs for past and
present emissions are roughly the same, as in the case of CO2, the
amount paid by each country would presumably be proportional to
their total anthropogenic emissions since the time that human-caused
emissions started causing problems. Where past emissions cause less
damage and cost less to control than current emissions, the total
amount paid by each country would be the sum of the damages and
costs from past and current emissions. These payments, in turn,
would be used to provide incentives for the development and application of technologies that reduce GHG emissions. Because all countries that have emitted GHGs that have failed to dissipate in noninjurious ways would be obligated to pay, all such countries would have an
incentive to reduce emissions. Although the payments would be mandatory, the emission decisions would be voluntary. In the case of CO2,
all emissions since the time that atmospheric levels of CO2 started to
rise would be included, because these emissions are either still in the
atmosphere or have been absorbed by the oceans (causing a deleterious effect on ocean acidification). Funds generated by these mandatory payments could be used to pay for the least expensive and most
effective remedies—including engineered climate selection, nuclear
power, incentives to reduce CO2 emissions from air travel, and public
educational efforts aimed at where they are likely to be effective—
regardless of where these remedies occur or what technologies they
use.
It is important that this “ideal” successor to Kyoto be fully enforceable. One critical design issue would be how to establish fair and
equitable payments for emissions. The ideal approach would be to set
levels that would just accomplish the desired goals—for instance, a
o
limit of 2 C on world temperature increases and a corresponding (but
as yet unestablished) goal for limits on ocean acidification. If the
temperature goals were to be achieved using stratospheric radiative
forcing only, the fee levels would presumably be very low—-probably
so low that such a complicated agreement might not be worth pursuing. If, on the other hand, a serious effort were undertaken to prevent ocean acidification, much higher levels would be required. It
would be important to allow some flexibility so that prices could be
changed if goals were or were not being met. Such an approach
would encourage an incentive approach rather than a coercive approach to climate change control. Individuals and nations could decide whether to burn and pay, or use alternatives and not pay. They
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could also choose whether to accept financial assistance from the
fund.
It must be emphasized that such a proposal would not solve all the
problems of Kyoto. The principal remaining difficulty would be the
high cost of preventing ocean acidification and the reluctance of people and governments to pay that cost. But if the world wants to reduce
global GHG emissions, this proposal may offer a possible way forward
toward that end, and might provide a basis on which the nations of
the world could agree. All countries would be liable, although most
(but not all) of the costs would still be paid by the developed world.
F. Conclusions with Respect to Specific Climate Change Problems
Part V.D summarized the general conclusions regarding efficiency
and effectiveness of each remedy for the climate change problem as a
whole. This Section applies those conclusions to suggest solutions to
each of the four specific climate change problems delineated in Part
I.B and in Tables 1 and 1a. Table 1 presents the results in the form of
words; Table 1a uses the numbers from Table 2 to provide rough
semi-numerical estimates of the effectiveness and cost of the four
remedies to each of the four problems.
1. Gradual Increase in Global Temperatures (Problem P1)
A gradual increase in global temperatures has benefits as well as
costs. The benefits are primarily that fewer humans will be subjected
to cold temperatures and that some of the less useable Arctic areas
will be more available for human use. The costs have been widely described by those concerned about global warming, but are reduced by
the ability of humans to adapt to gradual changes.
The general conclusions outlined in Part V.D apply to this problem without change, so that Remedy G—adding optimized particles to
the stratosphere—appears to be the superior remedy. Gradual increases in global warming could most efficiently and effectively be
controlled using one of the radiative-forcing remedies. Attempts to
control global warming through GHG control are unlikely to be successful because of the lifestyle changes required and high costs involved. The principal result of efforts to do so may be to delay effective action. Radiative-forcing remedies are among the few realistic
alternatives available. They could best be carried out on an internationally cooperative basis, but could also be implemented on a “go-italone” basis at the risk of possible international condemnation.
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2. Nontemperature Effects of Higher Atmospheric GHG Levels (P2)
Some of the nontemperature effects appear to be positive rather
than negative; the positive ones actually favor the use of Remedy G,
since it would not disturb the increasing atmospheric CO2 levels. The
primary example is the positive effect of elevated CO2 levels on some
plant growth. Presumably, both those plants whose growth is stimulated by higher CO2 concentrations, as well as the animals and humans who consume them, will be better off by such higher concentrations. Current research suggests that cultivated crops and some
180
weeds may indeed benefit, though perhaps at the expense of other
plants that are not stimulated by higher CO2 levels. The stimulation
of cultivated crops may be a major benefit to humans. The major adverse, nontemperature-related effect of elevated GHG levels appears
to be increased ocean acidification, but others may be documented in
future years. Any of the remedies other than A, F, G, and H can be
used to decrease or control the growth of atmospheric CO2 levels, and
therefore ocean acidification. Remedy C, (artificial CO2 sequestration), Remedy D (intensive forestry), and Remedy E (ocean fertilization) can be used to directly remove CO2 from the atmosphere. The
capture and use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery and the addition of
limestone or other alkaline minerals to streams of newly generated
CO2, or possibly directly to the oceans, may be somewhat lower in cost
than other options in limited geographical settings. The Royal Society
181
argues that using limestone is infeasible on an oceanwide basis, but
does not comment on its use in CO2 streams and does not provide
cost estimates or other bases for judging this. Furthermore, it provides only vague cautionary comments concerning the possibility of
182
iron fertilization of the oceans.
Therefore, many questions appear to need answers: What would
be the benefits gained from increased output from cultivated agriculture? What would be the cost of ocean neutralization using limestone? And to what extent would large scale phytoplankton fertilization increase carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere and the
180

See Henry Fountain, Climate Change: The View from the Patio, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2006, § 4, at 16 (noting that some weed-like plants and certain tree species thrive in an
atmosphere rich in CO2).
181
See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 37 (suggesting that practical concerns,
such as transport and processing costs, as well as unknown environmental effects, militate against this approach).
182
Id. (noting that this approach may also exacerbate chemical changes to the
ocean and have potentially negative biological impacts).
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oceans in the longer term and with what effects on ocean ecosys183
184
tems? Despite the efforts by the Royal Society to discuss remedies,
we may still be in the early stages of analyzing what can and should be
done about ocean acidification. Since all the current CO2 emission
mitigation strategies have been designed to treat Problem P1, some
effort would appear to be needed to refine them for treating ocean
acidification.
The ocean acidification problem is likely to be the most difficult
of the problems identified in this Article because of its potentially
high cost, many unknowns, and relative invisibility to most humans.
This is illustrated by the views of Ken Caldeira, a prominent scientist
in the area of ocean acidification and one of the authors of the Royal
Society report. He has suggested that ocean acidification can really
only be addressed by avoiding almost any further CO2 emissions since
185
he believes any net emissions will have an adverse effect.
He has
186
suggested a 98% reduction from current emission levels, apparently
assuming that other natural forces reducing atmospheric CO2 levels
might counteract the remaining 2%. The Royal Society report and
Caldeira cite the high cost and practical difficulties of geoengineering
approaches toward mitigating the chemical effects of increased at187
mospheric CO2 concentrations on the oceans.
But as noted in Part
III, decreasing CO2 emissions will be a difficult and at best a very slow
undertaking. Reducing them by 98% does not appear to be within
the realm of realistic possibility in the current world. But not reducing CO2 emissions will result in the extinction of the world’s coral
188
reefs, Caldeira argues.
Surely before this is allowed to happen it

183

For a discussion of some of the scientific issues implicated by ocean neutralization strategies, see generally SCOR/IOC Symposium Planning Comm., The Ocean in a
High-CO2 World, OCEANOGRAPHY, Sept. 2004, at 72.
184
See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 37.
185
See, e.g., Ken Caldeira, What Corals Are Dying To Tell Us About CO2 and
Ocean Acidification, lecture paper for the Eighth Annual Roger Revelle Commemorative Lecture presented by the Ocean Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences (Mar. 5, 2007); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, The Darkening Sea, NEW YORKER, Nov.
20, 2006, at 70.
186
Caldeira, supra note 185, at 9, 14.
187
See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 37, for a discussion of using limestone to
reduce ocean acidity. This characterization of Caldeira’s views on both using limestone and other geoengineering approaches is based on a personal discussion with
him on March 5, 2007.
188
Caldeira is quoted as stating that “[c]oral reefs will go the way of the dodo
unless we quickly cut carbon-dioxide emissions.” Press Release, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, Regardless of Global Warming, Rising CO2 Levels Threaten Ma-
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would be worthwhile to carefully reexamine all available geoengineering options, including those rejected by the Royal Society and Caldeira, since these would appear to be the only realistic options available that might satisfy Caldeira’s concerns as to the effects of ocean
acidification.
Although it has not really been demonstrated, this Article will assume that a careful analysis would show that preventing ocean acidification that would substantially damage the Earth’s coral reefs or other
marine ecosystems is worthwhile from an economic viewpoint. This is
by no means clear and deserves much further study, but appears to be
the most conservative assumption under current circumstances of uncertainty. It does appear likely that the most effective remedies are
those that can be implemented without the need for changes in per189
sonal lifestyle decisions.
That would suggest primarily Remedy E
(ocean fertilization), or Remedy C (artificial CO2 sequestration), or
possibly the use of limestone to neutralize the acidification caused by
the higher levels of CO2. Fertilizing the oceans appears to be effective
in reducing atmospheric CO2 levels and is one of the lower cost remedies for reducing atmospheric CO2, but there is a need for research to
greatly increase its effectiveness in exporting carbon to the deep
190
ocean.
Another important question is whether the use of Remedy E
might directly reduce ocean acidification in the ocean layers in which
phytoplankton live. Increased CO2 removal by fertilized phytoplankton would presumably decrease concentrations of carbonic acid in
these waters. This would likely trigger increased absorption of CO2 by
the oceans from the atmosphere in order to maintain chemical equilibrium and would lower atmospheric concentrations, but might nevertheless directly result in increased ocean pH levels as well. If so,
Remedy E would be (1) an attractive option for lowering atmospheric
CO2 concentrations and, indirectly, ocean acidification; (2) the most
attractive option for directly reducing ocean acidification; and (3) an
interesting opportunity to increase ocean productivity, since phytoplankton forms the base of much of the oceanic food chain. This
would seem to be a very useful area for further research. Artificial

rine Life (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/
MediaAlerts/2007/2007030824507.html.
189
As previously discussed in Section III.C.4.
190
See supra Part V.B.2.
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CO2 sequestration appears to cost much more, but it has fewer uncertainties.
3. Potential for Triggering “Tipping Points”(P3)
Although not widely discussed in the popular literature, this may
well be the real danger of global warming since the resulting changes,
if they occur, may be sudden and catastrophic in nature, and may be
very difficult for humans or other life forms to adapt to. It appears
reasonable that the risks from “tipping points” or other abrupt climate
changes may be proportional to global or regional temperature
changes. The lower the increase in temperatures, the lower the
chance that a “tipping point” will be hit. If global temperatures could
be held at levels typical for interglacial periods, presumably the
chances would be even less based on evidence from previous such periods. But conversely, any time that a higher “target” temperature is
adopted, the risk is presumably increased. Thus, failure to actually
achieve a given goal or target may carry with it an increased risk of
abrupt climate change. The EU and others have decided that an ino
191
crease of less than 2 C does not carry with it significant risks, but
there is no way to know whether this is actually the case without carrying out the experiment. Rather, it appears more plausible that risk
increases along with any increase in temperature, notwithstanding
targets for acceptable temperature increase. So if, for example, the
Kyoto approach does not achieve a particular objective, there is likely
to be some increase in the risk relative to the situation if it were met.
Since this Article has argued that the Kyoto approach is unlikely
to meet many of the current targets, it is important to ask which
remedies may offer something useful if it becomes evident that a particular “trigger point” is about to be hit or an abrupt climate change is
about to occur. In this case, among those remedies discussed in this
Article, only the radiative-forcing ones might be implemented rapidly
enough to control global temperatures and thereby avert the pending
risk. It would appear feasible to use radiative-forcing remedies in a
“rapid response” mode to greatly reduce these risks if advance preparations are in place. The issue here is the ability to react rapidly
enough to signs that a “tipping point” is approaching so as to avoid
actually triggering it. All of the remedies have the potential to curb
191

Press Release, EU, Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius (Jan.
10, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/07/16.
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the gradual increase in temperatures, but only F, G, and H appear to
have the flexibility to actually take evasive action if a “tipping point”
should appear imminent.
Implementing rapid changes in global GHG emissions in response
to unexpected events is next to impossible. Because of its extreme
flexibility, Remedy H has perhaps the greatest potential, followed by
Remedies F and G. It is important to note that these remedies would
have to be in place and ready to go in order to be useful in most
“rapid responses,” such as those envisioned in this paragraph and in
Part V.F.4, infra. Waiting until the need becomes evident to make
these preparations would make an effective response more problematic. In the case of Remedy G, being in place and ready to go involves
carrying out the further development work discussed in this Article—
i.e., building international agreement as to how this remedy would be
employed if needed and arranging for the needed manufacturing and
delivery means. In the case of Remedy H, it would mean actually
building the solar deflector and building a command and control capability to use it effectively. Remedies B through E have very little to
nothing to offer with regard to this problem.
4. Short-Term Cooling from Major Volcanic Eruptions and
Nuclear Conflicts (P4)
Because of the unexpected nature of such events and the need to
respond in a very short period of time if global cooling is to be
avoided, only Remedies F, G, and H have the potential to play a useful
role in responding. H is probably more useful than G, assuming that
it could be built in time, because of the possibly lower lag time required to move a deflector than to launch particles into the stratosphere. Depending on the particles used, there might also be conflict
with the sulfur compounds emitted during a volcanic eruption. Because significant global cooling probably has greater adverse effects
than warming, and because of the risk that short-term cooling could
turn into long-term cooling—even an extremely destructive ice age—
the benefits of avoiding short-term cooling appear to be greater than
often realized.
G. Implications for the Choice of Remedies
There would appear to be two conclusions from this analysis.
First, the participating Annex I nations appear to have selected
one of the more difficult, expensive, and probably ineffective ap-
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proaches—the Kyoto Protocol—to climate change control examined
in this Article. If it could be fully and effectively implemented and
expanded upon in future agreements, Kyoto might help to control
ocean acidification (problem P2), but the available evidence indicates
that all the other presently known climate change problems could be
mitigated more rapidly, cheaply, efficiently, and effectively using engineered climate selection involving radiative-forcing—i.e., Remedy G,
or possibly Remedies F or H. Even if effectively implemented, Kyoto
would not provide protection against global cooling from major volcanic eruptions or nuclear conflicts (Problem P4) or the ability to
evade “tipping points” (P3) if not recognized decades in advance.
However, Kyoto does appear to be more effective and efficient than
most of the alternative management tools examined in Part V.E, with
the exception of a “go-it-alone” strategy involving radiative forcing.
Second, an efficient and effective solution would seem to be active
pursuit of both geoengineering approaches involving radiative forcing, as well as a new effort to reduce ocean acidification, with immediate priority given to the former in order to rapidly solve what are potentially the most critical problems. Although significant efforts
would be needed in order to fine tune the proposals to implement
these geoengineering approaches, to build an international mechanism for making decisions, and to manufacture and launch the
needed material and hardware, this approach could be used to rapidly
reduce the risks of adverse feedback and tipping point problems due
to global warming and global cooling from major volcanic eruptions
or nuclear conflicts, and to rapidly stabilize global temperatures at any
desired level. At the same time, the current GHG emission-control efforts could be refocused on the problem of reducing ocean acidification, with an early review of how acidification can best be mitigated
and how the present international GHG emission-control efforts
could be modified to make them much more efficient and effective
for this new (but probably closely related) purpose.
The net result would be much earlier and more efficient control
of three of the more detailed problems and at least the same progress
(or lack thereof) in controlling ocean acidification as under the Kyoto
approach (Remedy B). This would appear to provide significant gains
and no losses compared to the Kyoto-only approach. This should also
allow some time to better understand ocean acidification and to design and carry out a carefully crafted program to reduce it.
Several suggestions have been made concerning those geoengineering approaches that appear to be the most efficient and effective
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ways of reducing acidification, but it is clear that the problem deserves
much greater attention and research. The problem of increasing
global temperatures could theoretically also be solved by carbon dioxide emission controls, although it is doubtful how effective this approach would be. If such emission controls were used, the place to
start would appear to be implementation of the lowest cost options
first, while possibly delaying the more expensive ones until the problem is better understood. Such a delay would be economically rational given the sensitivity of the costs of carbon dioxide emissions reductions to the rapidity with which they occur. Substituting lower
emission technology would be much cheaper if the goods in which
the technology is embedded need to be replaced anyway due to old
age or technological obsolescence. T.M.L. Wigley provides some at192
mospheric modeling along these lines.
This approach might also
provide time to build a better replacement for Kyoto that remedies
some of its most glaring problems.
The proposed priorities among the various remedies are shown in
Tables 1 and 1a. The rationale is as follows: Remedy G appears to be
very inexpensive and very effective in rapidly solving all climate
change problems other than ocean acidification. Therefore, it is
given the highest priority, or 1.
It has been demonstrated on a small scale that oceanic phytoplankton growth and CO2 absorption can be increased by using Remedy E (ocean fertilization). This would be significantly more expensive than Remedy G, but much less than Remedy C, and appears to be
the most attractive of the carbon sequestration approaches. It should
also increase the productivity of the seas. So it is accorded a priority
of 2, but with some questions concerning how humans can efficiently
imitate nature in stimulating phytoplankton to export carbon onto
the sea floor.
Ocean acidification can be addressed directly using limestone either to neutralize those streams of CO2 near oceans and sources of
limestone or to advance oil recovery, but this is much more expensive
and would be feasible only in limited geographical areas. Remedy C is
thus accorded the third highest priority, or 3.
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See T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization, 314 SCIENCE 452, 452-54 (2006). More specifically, Wigley concludes that
stratospheric geoengineering “could substantially offset future warming and provide
additional time to reduce human dependence on fossil fuels and so stabilize CO2 concentrations cost-effectively at an acceptable level.” Id. at 452.
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If it appears efficient to further reduce ocean acidification beyond
what could be achieved with Remedy E, it would also appear that the
most efficient remedies would involve CO2 sequestration somewhere
other than the ocean, since this could be done without worldwide cooperation. If it appears efficient to go beyond what CO2 sequestration
can efficiently accomplish to reduce ocean acidification, emission
controls would be required as a last resort, hopefully under something
similar to MA4. So this approach is accorded a priority of 4.
Whether ocean acidification reduction is worth pursuing beyond
purely voluntary efforts would appear to be the most difficult analytical issue concerning the most efficient and effective solutions to climate change problems. There would appear to be two major issues.
The first is the question of how much confidence one should have in
193
the Royal Society report conclusions.
Despite the eminence of its
authors, should the world really spend many trillions of dollars reducing ocean acidification on the basis of a single report, no matter the
source? Surely it is worth a small percentage of such expenditures to
re-check and re-analyze the report’s conclusions and even initiate new
experiments to verify its critical points.
The second major issue is whether the economic benefits of ocean
acidification reduction would exceed the costs. An economic evaluation of the issue based on currently available information depends
critically on the value of avoiding further ocean acidification offset by
the value of the positive effects of CO2 buildup in the atmosphere.
The Royal Society report suggests that if the world follows a businessas-usual approach with regard to the buildup of CO2 in the atmosphere, the resulting ocean acidification would in time have very severe
194
effects on the oceanic ecosystem.
This could indeed inflict great
damage on humans as well. Given the potentially very large cost of
mitigating this effect, a greatly expanded research program and analytical effort is crucial to making an informed decision on whether
and how rapidly to proceed with these very expensive CO2 mitigation
efforts.
Assuming that a decision is made that CO2 mitigation is worthwhile because of these effects, the inexpensive stratospheric geoengineering approaches, which would hopefully already be underway,
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See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 112, at 39-42 (detailing the “significant adverse
effects of ocean acidification” and recommending action to address the problem).
194
See id. at 39 (noting the rapid rate at which ocean pH levels will decrease in response to current emission patterns).
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should prove to be a wise investment since they would reduce global
warming until the ocean-acidification mitigation efforts took effect
and would provide an insurance policy against abrupt adverse climate
changes in either direction. In the case where a decision is made to
proceed with conventional CO2 emission reduction after Remedy G
has already been implemented, the relatively small added costs of
Remedy G would not be lost; all of the problems except ocean acidification would have been addressed earlier. In addition, the added capability to address problems P3 and P4 would presumably have proved
useful in and of itself. Finally, it should be noted that without advance
development, planning, international agreements, manufacturing,
and delivery systems, Remedies G and F could not fulfill these shorterterm climate control functions.
VI. LIKELY MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO ENGINEERED CLIMATE SELECTION
AND OTHER GEOENGINEERING REMEDIES
Assuming that any remaining technical problems in implementing
engineered climate selection and other attractive geoengineering
remedies could be resolved through a research and development program, the primary objections to these remedies are likely to be philosophical, legal, governmental, and strategic, as well as concerns
195
about the risk of unintended consequences.
A. Philosophical Objections
The major philosophical argument is likely to question whether
humans should take direct management responsibility for determining global temperatures and GHG levels in the atmosphere. Although
humans have been exerting an increasing effect on temperatures and
GHG levels, it has heretofore been left to nature rather than humans
to determine the outcome of this important aspect of the environment. The argument is likely to be that it is not acceptable to change
nature by changing Earth’s radiation balance or atmospheric GHG
levels directly. It seems to be generally agreed that it is acceptable to
change global temperatures by increasing or decreasing GHG emissions as long as it does not involve overt decisions. In other words, it
has until recently been acceptable to increase GHG emissions as long
as the increase is done for nonclimatic reasons, such as human gain or
195

For a much more comprehensive discussion of the first three of these and
other likely objections, see Michaelson, supra note 18, at 122-38.
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convenience, and the effects were generally unknown. Similarly, it
has been acceptable to decrease GHG emissions to an earlier level
since this merely rolls back some of humankind’s effects on the environment. But some may argue that it is not acceptable to deliberately
remove GHGs already in the atmosphere or to change Earth’s radiation balance directly, even though such an action would be for exactly
the same purpose—to decrease global warming. That, it may be argued, would be interfering with “nature.” A very good case, however,
can be made that human-induced GHG releases are already interfering with “nature,” as would proposed reductions, just in a less overt
and less effective way. And directly managing global temperatures
and GHG concentrations focuses attention on an environmentally
important issue—the optimal temperature regime and GHG concentrations for the earth.
An additional aspect of this argument is that although human activities have brought about a number of adverse unintended consequences as a result of economic development, humans heretofore
have responded to these problems by finding new technical, scientific,
and natural resource solutions without significantly reducing human
welfare. The use of engineered climate selection and other geoengineering approaches would follow this tradition rather than slowing
human development in order to deal with the latest such problem in
what some may regard as a more “natural” way.
B. Legal Obstacles
Attempts to use engineered climate selection or other geoengineering remedies to “solve” climate change problems might run into
the problem that much of the western legal system assumes that there
is no recovery for damages resulting from “acts of God.” But if a person or government deliberately alters Earth’s radiation balance or atmospheric GHG levels, even for a positive purpose, this may open up
the possibility that those responsible could be sued for damages sustained due to climate-related events believed to be a result of their actions. The most obvious solution to this problem would be a change
in the law to either deny recovery of damages from the use of such
remedies or to make such liabilities fall onto governments, who would
have to fund them out of taxes. This appears to be an area where legal inputs would be much needed if such remedies are to be actually
used.
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C. Governmental Issues
In a world of sovereign countries, an international process would
need to be worked out to determine if, when, and how to deliberately
alter global temperatures or GHG levels. This process would have to
include processes for determining when results were unsatisfactory
and how policy changes would be instituted to solve problems that
196
might be encountered.
Although finding an acceptable process
would not be without difficulty, it is hard to imagine that it would be
more difficult than the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol,
and such a process would be needed if there are to be enforceable follow-on agreements, if such can even be accomplished. But once an
agreement is reached, the actual implementation would not depend
on the cooperation of many governments and people, as is the case
under Kyoto and other governmental regulatory decarbonization approaches. Obviously it would matter not only which governmental organizations were selected to carry out geoengineering, but also how
good a job they would do, since errors might well be costly. The main
hope is that the organizations could be held accountable and would
thereby have an incentive to do a good job. The alternative is to leave
the outcome to nature, which is not accountable and which has no incentive to help humans.
D. Strategic Difficulties
Some scientists may oppose the geoengineering conclusions
reached in this Article on the grounds that if global warming is
“solved” through engineered climate selection or other geoeneering
approaches, then it may be harder to persuade people to reduce fossil
197
fuel use.
This raises the question of whether the goal is to solve environmental problems or to achieve some other objective. The position taken here is that the purpose should be to solve important environmental problems in the most effective and efficient way available.
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For discussion of some of the alternatives for implementation, see Alan Carlin,
Implementation and Utilization of Geoengineering for Global Climate Change Control, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2007, at 56, 56-58.
197
See Ralph J. Cicerone et al., Global Environmental Engineering, 356 NATURE 472
(1992) (arguing that geoengineering solutions need to be taken more seriously);
Crutzen, supra note 6, at 217 (discussing the importance of “[b]uilding trust between
scientists and the general public”); Thomas C. Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of
Geoengineering, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 303, 303-07 (1996); Stephen H. Schneider, Geoengineering: Could—or Should—We Do It? 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 291, 291-302 (1996).
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Those who advocate a regulatory decarbonization-only approach risk
achieving nothing, and thereby contributing to the risks facing our
planet, in the hopes of achieving a different objective. It is better to
separate the various problems—gradual global warming, ocean acidification, global warming tipping points, and global cooling from volcanic eruptions and nuclear conflicts—and design a realistic program
to tackle each one. Otherwise, we risk everything on a single overall
solution that appears unlikely to be achieved, and which cannot solve
all of the problems anyway.
E. Unintended Consequences
An argument can be made that the earth’s climate system is so
complex and poorly understood that any attempt to directly manage it
through geoengineering would risk unintended adverse consequences. Humans got themselves into their current situation because
of the unintended consequences that resulted from their use of fossil
fuels and other GHG-producing activities to increase human productivity and welfare. Decarbonization approaches also carry substantial
risks that proponents almost never acknowledge—that they too may
198
result in unintended consequences and that they may not be effectively implemented and, as a result, the world will continue to warm,
with all the adverse effects that have been discussed. But it is also
conceivable that geoengineering would substantially solve the global
climate change problem while creating other unintended consequences. Certainly, there is much that we do not yet understand
about the climate system and how it would respond to various geoengineering efforts. But any approach would involve some amount of
uncertainty, especially before serious research and testing is undertaken. History suggests that it is not until humanity is confronted with
an immediate task and the need to learn enough to solve it that we
normally come to understand all that we need to know about a particular subject.
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See, e.g., Eric A. Mazzi & Hadi Dowlatebadi, Air Quality Impacts of Climate Mitigation: UK Policy and Passenger Vehicle Choice, 41 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 387, 387-92 (2007)
(concluding that taxing vehicles according to CO2 emission rates has resulted in a significant increase in consumer choice of small cars and diesel engines, which will have
significant adverse health effects); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Once a Dream Fuel, Palm
Oil May Be an Eco-Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at C1 (describing rising demand
for palm oil in Europe that has brought about the clearing of huge tracts of Southeast
Asian rainforest by burning and the overuse of chemical fertilizer).
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Although we cannot rule out the possibility of unintended consequences, this possibility can be minimized by a careful approach to
testing and implementing proposed geoengineering solutions that
take this possibility into account. For example, proposals can be
tested on smaller scales before implementing them on a larger scale.
This small-scale testing could ensure that changes were made or the
project terminated outright if serious adverse effects are encountered.
This is particularly needed when the effects of a large-scale approach
are not easily reversed.
Fortunately, the leading engineered climate selection proposals
do not appear to involve irreversibilities, and the effects appear to disappear in a relatively brief period. For example, in the case of stratospheric optimized particles, their effects could first be modeled further; if modeling did not reveal significant problems, we could follow
with subscale, real world experiments, and could finally try the approach in a limited geographical area—such as the Arctic, which is
experiencing the most rapid warming and has the lowest human
population. If significant adverse effects were observed, they would
dissipate within a year or two as particles gradually fell into the troposphere and were removed by normal atmospheric processes. In this
circumstance, other types of particles could be tested or the project
could be abandoned in the unlikely case that each type of suitable
particle proves to result in critical, adverse, and unintended consequences. But pursuit of the decarbonization approaches currently
proposed is very likely to result in continued global warming while the
world waits for, and is likely to be disappointed by, the meager results.
One could also argue that not enough is known to justify using
these relatively new geoengineering technologies. At the same time,
little or no effort has been made to carry out the research and devel199
opment required to supply the information needed to use these
technologies more effectively and efficiently. Given the promise of
many of these technologies, the modest cost of the necessary research,
the very large expenditures required for (and likely public dissatisfaction with) extensive GHG emission controls, and the possibly urgent
need to reduce global warming, it is difficult to argue that the research should not be undertaken.
A recent editorial by a prominent member of the U.S. scientific
establishment supports such research but also advocates a moratorium
199

See supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting the lack of research in
geoengineering).
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200

on any large-scale field experimentation.
Such a moratorium, however, is inconsistent with the urgency expressed by those concerned
about global warming who advocate very large expenditures to control
GHG emissions. It would appear premature to spend such sums on
emissions control without first fully testing the alternatives.
CONCLUSION
As of late 2006, many environmentalists, some developed nations,
and the state of California appear to have concluded that there is only
one climate change problem—global warming—and only one solution—reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, usually through the
Kyoto Protocol or similar regulatory decarbonization approaches.
This Article has argued instead that there are actually four major, interrelated problems, and after a careful analysis of these problems and
possible remedies for each of them, concluded that several different
approaches will be required to solve all of them. Although some
remedies can address certain climate change problems, none can address all of them. An effective and efficient climate change control
program needs to use the best available approaches to solving each
problem, instead of simply the single approach of reducing GHG
emissions.
This Article has assumed that global climate change is a major environmental problem—perhaps the most difficult one that the world
has ever faced. For the purposes of this Article, the climate change
problem includes four related problems: continued and gradual
global warming over the next few centuries; adverse effects unrelated
to temperature of increasing levels of GHGs in the atmosphere; the
potential effects of “tipping points” where warming may trigger particularly serious and abrupt adverse effects; and shorter-term episodes
of global cooling caused by volcanic eruptions or nuclear conflicts.
The Article then asked how effective and efficient a variety of management and technological approaches, particularly the Kyoto Protocol, would be in preventing or mitigating each of these problems, and
whether there are alternative approaches that would be more so. The
Article has taken a very broad view of the problem by including both
long- and short-term impacts of human activities and natural forces on
global temperatures and GHG levels. It is only by looking at all the
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Ralph J. Cicerone, Geoengineering: Encouraging Research and Overseeing Implementation, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 221, 221-26 (2006).
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major aspects of the problem that effective and efficient solutions can
be meaningfully discussed.
The Protocol and similar regulatory decarbonization approaches
will not prevent either global warming or cooling, nor will they meet
international goals for maximum temperature increases. If fully implemented, Kyoto would probably result in minor decreases in the
temperature rise that would otherwise occur and would not provide
any capability to respond to global cooling. One fundamental problem is that achieving the EU/UNFCC goals through a Kyoto-type approach would require the participation of most of the world’s governments and population—including many rapidly growing countries
that have not agreed to undertake any emission reductions—to restrict energy use in ways that would directly reduce their welfare, but
the Protocol does not provide the effective incentives and penalties
necessary to bring about such participation. It is difficult to see why
politicians would adopt such unpopular and expensive constraints on
their constituents’ activities or why many of their constituents would
not pursue every available loophole to avoid observing the imposed
constraints.
It is unlikely that possible Kyoto follow-on agreements could overcome these implementation problems. In addition to being very difficult to implement, the Kyoto approach is probably economically inefficient and would have to be very expensive if it were to have a major
impact on global temperatures. Additionally, it does not provide
credit for the use of much less expensive engineered climate selection, and it is particularly illsuited for affecting global temperatures
rapidly or flexibly. Trying to use it to rapidly decrease global warming
would be even more expensive because of the need to replace GHGemitting equipment early in the plan’s life cycle. Pursuit of regulatory
emissions reduction approaches is counterproductive, given their inherent implementation problems. Unfortunately, pursuing these approaches is likely to prevent serious consideration of more effective
measures during the long period needed for the major deficiencies of
this approach to become evident to all.
Given these very serious problems with the Kyoto approach, the
Article then asked if there are superior management and technological alternatives for controlling climate change. To that end, Parts IV
through V.E reviewed a wide array of control options using effectiveness, economic efficiency, and other relevant criteria. That analysis
concludes that superior alternatives exist involving radiative forcing
and that these alternatives would be technically sound; would allow
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continued growth of fossil fuel use; would very dramatically lower control costs; are economically efficient; would avoid the need for individual actions to reduce GHG emissions; and would permit relatively
precise, rapid, and flexible adjustment of global temperatures. These
alternatives, however, would not decrease any nontemperaturerelated adverse effects of GHGs, of which the most serious appears to
be ocean acidification.
With this as background, Part V.F then extended the analysis to
the four more detailed climate change problems:
(P1) Gradually increasing global warming could most rapidly, efficiently, and effectively be controlled using some of the more interesting radiative forcing or engineered climate selection remedies and result in significant adaptation expenses. As discussed, attempts to
control this warming through GHG control under the Kyoto Protocol
and similar approaches are likely to be very slow and largely unsuccessful. Other management approaches based on decentralized controls, voluntary actions, or liability for emissions would probably be
even slower and less successful and efficient. However well intentioned and helpful they may be if they reduce emissions that are less
expensive to control, there is also a danger that they will end up delaying effective action by providing false hope that these efforts will
prove sufficient. Radiative forcing remedies, on the other hand, are
some of the few realistic alternatives available to meet the current
temperature goals. They could best be carried out on an internationally cooperative basis, but could also be done on a “go-it-alone” basis
by technologically advanced countries, albeit at the risk of possible international condemnation.
(P2) The nontemperature-related effects of increasing GHGs in the atmosphere are both positive and negative. The major positive effect of high
levels of carbon dioxide (increased plant growth) would be lost if atmospheric levels were returned to “normal.” The most serious negative problem appears to be ocean acidification, but this problem is not
well understood and deserves much further research before potentially very expensive remedies are undertaken. The principal choices
for dealing with ocean acidification in particular appear to be: fertilizing the oceans with essential nutrients and minerals such as iron to
promote the growth of carbon dioxide absorbing phytoplankton; using limestone to neutralize streams of newly generated carbon dioxide
in advantageous circumstances; using carbon dioxide for enhanced oil
recovery; sequestering carbon dioxide; and reducing atmospheric
carbon dioxide emissions—in that order of decreasing attractiveness.

1488

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1401

Fertilizing the oceans appears to be the lowest cost solution, but research is needed to make it possible for humans to emulate the more
efficient approaches used by nature to export carbon onto the sea
floor.
(P3) Risks from “tipping points” or abrupt climate changes would likely
be reduced to the extent that atmospheric GHG levels and/or global
temperatures were reduced. But if, as also appears likely, GHGs are
not reduced to “normal” levels, the radiative-forcing remedies could
be used to directly control global temperatures, thereby greatly reducing the adverse feedbacks and risks resulting from temperature rises.
If imminent dangers should threaten, it furthermore appears feasible
to use some radiative forcing remedies in a “rapid response” mode to
greatly reduce these risks if advance preparations are in place to do so.
(P4) Shorter-term episodes of global cooling from major volcanic eruptions
are a certain, and possibly even catastrophic, risk; nuclear conflicts may
also occur with similar climatic consequences. Both can only be addressed through radiative forcing approaches. Advance preparations
would again be required.
An effective and efficient solution would be to actively pursue a
combination approach involving both engineered climate selection—
radiative forcing by means of stratospheric particles optimized for this
purpose—as well as a new effort to reduce ocean acidification. Immediate priority should be given to the former in order to quickly
solve all the problems unrelated to ocean acidification, while the
more difficult, much slower, and much more costly effort to reduce
ocean acidification is undertaken.
The cost of achieving the
EU/UNFCCC temperature goals by the use of engineered climate selection would be modest and would not require any human lifestyle
changes or adaptation to higher world temperatures (unless desired,
of course). It appears to be the most effective and efficient first step
toward global climate change control. This twofold approach could
be used to rapidly reduce the risks stemming from adverse feedback/tipping point problems, from global warming, and from global
cooling from major volcanic eruptions and nuclear conflicts. It could
also be used to rapidly stabilize average global temperatures to any desired level. This should also allow time for a greatly expanded effort
to better understand ocean acidification and to determine the extent
to which ocean pH levels need to be raised and how this can be best
achieved. Several suggestions have been made concerning geoengineering approaches, but it is clear that the problem deserves much
greater attention and research.
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Some aspects of the climate change problem could theoretically
also be solved by GHG emission controls, although it is doubtful how
effective they would be. If such emission controls were used, the place
to start would appear to be to implement the lowest-cost options first,
while delaying the more expensive ones until the problem is better
understood. Such a delay would be economically rational, given the
sensitivity of the costs of GHG emissions reductions to the rapidity
with which they occur.
A significant effort would be required to fine-tune the proposals
to implement engineered climate selection approaches, build an international mechanism for making decisions, and manufacture and
transport the needed material and hardware. Notwithstanding this
effort, this approach could be used to rapidly reduce the risks of adverse feedback or tipping point problems, to avoid significant adaptation expenses, and to rapidly stabilize global temperatures.
Some may object that not enough is known about these relatively
new technologies to justify their immediate use. At the same time,
however, little or no effort has been made to carry out the research
and development necessary to reduce these risks. Given the promise
of these technologies, the modest cost of the research, and the very
large expenditures necessary for, and likely public dissatisfaction with,
extensive GHG emission controls, it is difficult to understand why so
little of this research and development has been undertaken.
This Article has reviewed several management approaches besides
Kyoto and geoengineering projects, including voluntary efforts, nonKyoto-based regulatory decarbonization, and a new approach involving the use of all available technologies and approaches. It finds that
the voluntary, decentralized, and liability-based governmentdetermined decarbonization approaches are likely to be even less effective and efficient than the Kyoto approach. Efforts to reduce GHG
emissions on a less than national scale (as is being attempted in California) or even in a few countries, without equivalent actions by the
rest of the world—particularly the most rapidly developing ones—
cannot realistically achieve the temperature change limits adopted by
the European Union and based on United Nations goals. Failure to
achieve this goal is believed by proponents of GHG emission controls
to pose “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. Even a unified, worldwide effort to reduce GHG emissions to
this extent, should it ever be undertaken, would be highly problematic
because of the great dependence of modern society on energy use
and the reluctance of most people to give up the advantages offered
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by modern society. The cost of achieving these goals by the use of engineered climate selection, however, would be comparatively modest
and would not require any human lifestyle changes.
This Article therefore suggests a possible replacement for Kyoto,
which would correct a number of the Protocol’s deficiencies. If the
world follows a Kyoto approach, this Article suggests a possible replacement for the Kyoto Protocol that would correct a number of the
Protocol's deficiencies. But even in this case global temperatures appear almost certain to continue to increase, perhaps even at roughly
current rates. At some point in the future this may become all too
evident, and engineered climate selection may be more carefully considered. It would seem far better, however, not to wait until this happens before using engineered climate selection, since this would reduce the risk of hitting a tipping point, increase the possibility of
warding off abrupt climate changes, provide protection from volcanic
cooling or nuclear winters, and avoid various climate-induced unpleasantries and costly adaptation expenses in the meantime. Recently some have begun to advocate engineered climate selection as a
fallback or insurance policy, in case their preferred regulatory decarbonization approach does not solve the problem or an unforeseen
201
event occurs that requires a rapid response.
A more prudent and
efficient strategy would appear to be to implement engieneered climate selection first and then see what further needs to be done.
Finally, this Article discussed five of the primary impediments to
the use of engineered climate selection and other geoengineering approaches. Although these impediments are significant, they are easier
to solve than the already evident problems surrounding the Kyoto approach.
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See Crutzen, supra note 6.
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APPENDIX

Figure 1: Costs and Benefits of Carbon Removal
C. CO2
sequestration

D. Intense
forestry

E. Ocean
fertilization

F.Sulfates
in stratosphere

G Particles in
stratos

H Space
deflector

25

$/ton carbon removed

50

B. Conven
under
Kyoto

0

Tol's estimated benefits

Prepared by Alan Carlin based on Table 2 for costs and on Tol, supra note 128, for
benefits. Marginal cost in U.S. dollars per ton carbon of CO2 emissions mitigated for
Column B. Other costs represent the range of estimated costs for categories of
technology. There are believed to be some cases where the costs of Row B remedies
are less than the marginal cost and even less than benefits.
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Table 1: Usefulness of Selected Remedies in Solving Detailed
Climate Change Problems

P3: Risks
from “Tipping Points”

P1: Gradual
Global Warming

P2: Ocean
Acidification

B: Conventional under
Kyoto Protocol

Effective if ever
achieved, which
is very unlikely;
high cost; very
slow results

C: Artificial
CO2 sequestration/
neutralization

Effective but
high cost except
possibly neutralization in
ideal cases

If ever
achieved
(unlikely),
would reduce
but not
eliminate
problem;
high cost
Effective but
high cost
except some
neutralization

Vary with
temperatures.
Useless as a
rapid response to
imminent
threats and to
cooling
Probably useless except
for increasing
temperatures
by releasing
concentrated
CO2

E: Ocean
fertilization

Probably effective if humans
can learn how
to employ it as
efficiently as
nature does;
relatively low
cost.
Effective immediately; lowest
cost

[Same as
(P1)(E) cell.]

Can be
started and
stopped rapidly, but effects probably
too gradual
to be effective
Can be
quickly reduced with
temperatures
and also used
for fairly
rapid response

G: Optimized particles in
stratosphere

No effect

P4: Short-term
Cooling from
Volcanic Eruptions/Nuclear
Conflicts

Proposed
Priority

Useless

4

Unlikely to be
useful, although
where CO2 is in
concentrated
form, it could
theoretically be
released with
care
Not applicable

3

2

Effective as soon
as particles are
distributed
unless there are
interactions with
volcanic emissions

1

The problem (P) numbers refer to those listed in Part I.B. The control options are
identified by letters corresponding to the row numbers in Table 2 and the remedy (R)
letters used in Parts IV and V. See Part V.G for an explanation of the proposed priorities.
Prepared by Alan Carlin based on Table 2 and text.
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Table 1a: Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Remedies by
Detailed Problem in Symbols

B: Conventional under
Kyoto Protocol

P1: Gradual
Global Warming

P2: Ocean
Acidification

X
$$$$

X
$$$$

C: Artificial
CO2 sequestration/
neutralization

√√√√
$$$$

E: Ocean
fertilization

√√√
$/10

G: Optimized particles in
stratosphere

√√√√
$/1000

√√√√
$$$$

√√√
$/10

NA

P4: Short-term
Cooling from
Volcanic Eruptions/ Nuclear
Conflicts

Proposed
Priority

NA

4

Quick response:
NA
Long term:
√√√√
$$$$

Usually NA

3

Quick response:
NA
Long term:
√√√
$/10

NA

2

√√√√
$/1000

1

P3: Risks
from “Tipping Points”
Long term:
X
$$$$

Quick response:
Limited
√√√√
$/1000

Explanation of symbols used:
X: Ineffective
√√√√: Highly effective
√√√: Probably effective if humans can learn to employ it as efficiently as nature does.
$: Marginal cost of about $100 per ton carbon or equivalent
$$$$: Marginal cost of about $400 per ton carbon or equivalent
$/10: Cost of about $10 per ton of carbon removed
$/1000: Cost of about 10 cents per ton carbon or equivalent
NA: Not applicable
Based on data in the corresponding rows of Table 2 but using the format of Table 1.
Detailed estimates shown in Table 2 are used to approximate the effectiveness and cost
of the remedies in an easier-to-understand form. See Parts V.G of the text for an explanation of the proposed priorities.
Prepared by Alan Carlin based on Table 2 and text.
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Table 2: Evaluation of Some Alternative Detailed Remedies for
202
Controlling Global Climate Change
1: Effective
Environmental
Outcome

2: Dynamic
Efficiency

3: Cost
Effectiveness

3a: Cost of
Controla

4: Distributional Equity

Base case;
not optimal
due to high
cost of climate
change
Probably
strongly
negative
since marginal costs
are higher
than climate
change
benefits of
perhaps
$15 per ton
Negative to
strongly
negative

No costs involved

NAb

Low compared to
some technological approaches

50-400ac
Estimated
marginal
cost to
achieve EU/
UNFCCC
goals

Costs of warming may be
greatest for
those near sea
level including
low-lying LDCs
Only industrial
countries face
targets but
LDCs help
shape rules.
LDCs receive
some adaptation assistance

Low

50-150;d
60-300h for
CCS underground; 80400h for
ocean injection

Implementation costs
borne by initiators; benefits
and other possible costs
borne by all

R1/A: No intentional climate change
control (business as usual)

Very low—
depends on
“dumb luck” to
muddle
through

R2/B: Regulatory decarbonization using
“conventional”
technologies
under the
Kyoto Protocol

Probably low
given limited
mitigation
goals, shortterm commitments, and
limited incentives

C: CO2 artificial sequestration using
injection underground or
neutralization
in oceans

High if carried
out on massive
scale

D: Intensive
forestry to capture carbon in
harvest-ed trees

Low because of
uncertainty
about rate of
accumulation

Likely to
be negative
but some
projects
could be
positive

Low

10-100d

Implementation costs
borne by initiators; benefits
and other possible costs
borne by all

E: Ocean fertilization with
phosphate/
iron

Probably high
if humans can
be as effective
as nature is

Probably
high

High—but
not the highest

1-10d

Implementation costs
borne by initiators; benefits
and other possible costs
borne by all

202

See supra Part V.
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Table 2: Evaluation of Some Alternative Detailed Remedies for
Controlling Global Climate Change
6: Participation &
Compliance

7: Other
Environmental Risks

8: Additional Considerations

None
needed

None

Included as
base case

No

Incentives
very weak;
requires
massive
international cooperation
& bureaucratic effort;

None
known

Not likely
but possible to remove CO2
if concentrated

No

International cooperation
desirable
for siting
purposes

Only very
slowly

Could remove trees
and burn
them

No

Yes

No

No

Cooperation and
approval
of landowners
and probably governments
required
International cooperation
desirable

Probably low
risk except
for ocean
injection,
which could
contribute
to ocean
acidification. Potential leakage
problems
for underground
Low risk;
intensive
cultivation
will impact
soils and
biodiversity

Protocol
already in
place calling
for reductions by
some countries; reductions in oil
use increases national security
Some experience
with old oil
and gas
fields; possible NIMBY
problems
elsewhere

5: Flexibility

5a: Alter
Pace

5b: Global
Cooling

5c: Temp.
Redistribution

Little desired or
likely

NA

NA

NA

Emission
ceilings
locked in
but only
for 5 years;
climate
response
very slow

Possible
but very
difficult

No

Could be
halted rapidly, but
increase in
pace could
only be
done slowly

Yes

Almost no
flexibility
because of
time required to
stop, start,
or harvest
trees
Medium to
control
warming
but difficult to reduce nutrient flow

May be
some risks
due to many
unknowns at
large scales

Political
issues: who
pays costs?;
whose land
is used?

Possible
liability and
other legal
concerns;
increased
productivity
of ocean
food chain
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Table 2 (cont.)
1: Effective
Environmental
Outcome

2: Dynamic
Efficiency

3: Cost
Effectiveness

3a: Cost of
Controla

4: Distributional Equity

F: Sulfurcontaining particles added to
stratosphere to
control global
warming

Very high;
proven by major volcanic
eruptions; no
ocean acidification mitigation

Strongly
positive;
CO2 increases
would also
aid agriculture

Very high for
cooling purposes

<<1d

Probably
fairer;e implementation
costs borne by
initiators;
benefits and
other possible
costs borne by
all

G: Optimized
radiative forcing by injecting
specialized
substances in
stratosphere,
e.g., see supra
note 124

Very high
based on (F)
but unproven
in real world
trials; no ocean
acidification
mitigation

Strongly
positive for
warming;
Other
benefits,
e.g., UV
protection,
plant
growth,
offset volcanic eruption

Very high for
both heating
and cooling

<<1f, or, at
the risk of
trying to be
too precise,
0.02 to 0.1g

Probably
fairer;e implementation
costs borne by
initiators;
benefits and
other possible
costs received/
borne by all

H: Optimized
radiative forcing by building
flexible deflector in space
between Earth
and Sun as
specified in
supra note 125

High but no
experience
with building
anything so
large so far
from Earth; no
ocean acidification mitigation

Appears to
be high for
warming;
other benefits, e.g.,
UV protection, plant
growth,
offset volcanic eruption

High for
both heating
and cooling
unless cost is
very high

0.2-2f (costs
much less
certain
here, and
probably
underestimated—see
text)

Probably
fairer;e implementation
costs borne by
initiators;
benefits and
other possible
costs received/
borne by all

c

Prepared by Alan Carlin based on alternatives analyzed by Lasky (Remedy B), Keith
d
h
j
f
2000 (Remedies C, D, E, and F), IPCC (E), NAS 1992 (F), Keith 2001 (G and H),
e
i
Michaelson (Columns 1, 4, & 6), and Teller et al. 1997, 1999, and 2002, and 2004 (F,
G, and H).
Footnotes for Table 2:
a
Marginal cost in U.S. dollars per ton carbon of CO2 emissions (or equivalent) mitigated for Row B only. Other costs in this column represent the range of estimated
costs for categories of technology. There will be some cases where the costs of Row B
remedies are a lot less than the marginal cost.
b
Does not apply; since none are mitigated, there is no cost of mitigation.
c
See Lasky, supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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Table 2 (cont.)

d

5c: Temp.
Redistribution

6: Participation &
Compliance

5: Flexibility

5a: Alter
Pace

5b: Global
Cooling

High at
least to
control
warming.
Changes
depend on
residence
time in
stratosphere

Intensify
rapidly; 5
year lag to
decrease
intensity

Not without changing substance
used

Possible
but only to
cool

Not required
once remedy agreed
on

High for
both warming and
cooling.
Good
chance for
controlling
abrupt
climatic
changes, as
from volcanic eruption
Extremely
high for
both warming and
cooling;
best chance
for controlling abrupt
climatic
changes as
from volcanic eruption

Intensify
rapidly; 5
year lag to
decrease
intensity

Yes by
changing
substances
used

Possible by
varying
application by
latitude

Not required
once remedy agreed
on

Intensify
almost
immediately by
adjusting
deflector

Yes by
changing
deflector
placement

Not clear
from available info;
research
required

Not required
once remedy agreed
on

7: Other
Environmental Risks

8: Additional Considerations

Medium-possible
adverse interactions
with other
stratospheric species; no reduction in
ocean acidification
Probably low
risk but
needs careful research,
particularly
on impact
on stratospheric
chemistry.
Ocean acidification not
addressed

Possible
liability if
courts
should decide that
disasters
have resulted

Probably
even lower
risk than G
but still
needs careful research;
quickly reversible if
unforeseen
problems.
Ocean acidification not
addressed.

Could reduce adverse effects
of solar radiation on
earth. Possible liability
problem.

Possible
liability
problem

See Keith, supra note 17.
See Michaelson, supra note 18.
f
See Keith, supra note 156.
g
This range of estimates assumes an estimated cost of $0.2 to $1.0 billion per year,
Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119, and an assumed offset of approximately 10 gigatons of carbon per year. The cost estimates assume that various
types of particles are carried into the stratosphere using a fleet of six high-altitude
cargo planes. Ten gigatons is representative of the carbon emission reduction needed
to achieve a 450 ppmv CO2 level in the atmosphere compared to projected IS92a emissions in 2060.
h
See IPCC supra note 113; based on Table SPM.5 with dollar values for capture from
new large-scale power plants with dollars per ton CO2 converted to dollars per ton carbon.
i
See Teller, Active Climate Stabilization, supra note 119.
j
See generally souces by Teller, supra note 18.
e

